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ABSTRACT 
 
The complex reality of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict gives rise 
to violent confrontations between Palestinians and Israeli security 
forces, which frequently lead to bodily injuries and damage to 
property of Palestinian civilians.  While victims of armed conflict 
are often forced to resort to international tribunals in order to seek 
redress for such grievances, the Israeli legislator has created a 
mechanism that allows Palestinians to bring tort claims against the 
State of Israel before Israeli civil courts.  In the last decade, though, 
this legislation has become significantly more restrictive, effective-
ly denying state liability for Palestinians’ injuries.  This Study is a 
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first systematic attempt to empirically evaluate this unique com-
pensation mechanism.  Through the lens of scholarship on judici-
ary-legislature relations, as developed in the United States and in 
Israel, this study investigates the role of lower courts adjudicating 
the politically-charged tort cases of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.  
Employing both quantitative and qualitative methods, the Study 
utilizes content analysis of 245 decisions rendered by Israeli trial 
courts between 1992 and 2012, supplemented by in-depth inter-
views with relevant stakeholders.  While scholars tend to focus on 
the interests of, and power struggles between, legislatures and su-
preme courts, this Article studies the relationship between law and 
politics in lower courts.  It explores changes in the attitudes of 
courts towards Palestinians' tort claims against Israel, revealing the 
power dynamic between the Israeli legislature and civil trial courts.  
The Study shows a judicial attempt to defend lower courts' institu-
tional independence despite the legislature's efforts to dictate a 
specifically desired judicial decision-making process. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The relationship between the three democratic branches has 
long troubled scholars from various disciplines.  Specifically, 
scholars have struggled with defining the nature of the complex re-
lations between courts and legislatures, in trying to understand 
how judicial decision-making, and consequently, the law itself, are 
affected by this dynamic.  Much of the dialogueat times bat-
tlebetween these entities takes place through the process of legis-
lation and statutory interpretation, turning this domain into fertile 
ground for the study of these institutional relations.  Unfortunate-
ly, most of the work done towards the purpose of explaining this 
relationship and its bearing on the law has focused on supreme 
courts.  As a result of this scholarly focus, while we seem to have 
some sense of what it means for a Supreme Court justice to act stra-
tegically, this is less clear for lower court judges.  Yet, if we are in-
terested in what constrains courts in their decision-making process 
and in the impact of the relations between the branches on statuto-
ry interpretation, studying the lower courts is of much im-
portance.1  
 The complexity of the relationship between courts and legis-
latures on the one hand, and the scarcity of meaningful analysis of 
lower courts’ interaction with legislatures on the other hand, creat-
ed the motivation for this Study.  The main objective of this Study 
is to examine how lower courts react to a legislative change, aimed 
at altering their case law by confining their judicial discretion.  In 
order to delve into this question, the research undertakes a case 
study situated at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (here-
inafter, also “the Conflict”), a politically-charged backdrop which 
serves as an intriguing setting for investigating the relations be-
tween the legislature and the judiciary.  The Study looks at tort 
claims filed by Palestinian civilians against the State of Israel (“the 
State”) due to damages sustained from actions of the Israeli Mili-
tary (“IDF”).  The regulation of this issue was subject to a signifi-
                                                 
1 See Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously 265 (N.Y.U. Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory Working Papers, Paper 21, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2006), 
http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/21 [https://perma.cc/3W9T-GYS4] (“Un-
doubtedly there are reasons to study the Supreme Court.  It is a central policy-
making institution in American government.  Yet, for many of the questions being 
asked by scholars, studying the lower courts may make more sense.”). 
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cant legislative change in 2002, which placed substantial hurdles in 
the path of Palestinians seeking remedy from Israel, and confined 
courts’ discretion in deciding these sensitive claims.  Yet, this im-
portant domain has been understudied, from a purely legal per-
spective and especially from a socio-legal point of view.  It thus 
constitutes an ideal setting to apply the literature on judiciary-
legislature relations to the context of lower courts adjudicating po-
litically-charged cases in the face of a legislative change.   
 To this end, the Study conducts an empirical examination of 
trial court decisions in these cases.2  Through content analysis of 
245 court decisions rendered between 1992 and 2012,3 supplement-
ed by several in-depth interviews with relevant stakeholders, the 
research explores changes that occurred in the attitudes of trial 
court judges towards the disputes in question, in reaction to the re-
strictive, anti-plaintiff legislation and the political climate in Israel.  
The methodology of this Study was designed to deal with the 
complexity of empirically studying judicial decision-making.  By 
employing both quantitative and qualitative content analyses, it at-
tempts to capture various aspects of judicial opinions.  Additional-
ly, interviews conducted as part of this Study provide social and 
political context which is not always reflected in court decisions 
themselves.  
 Based on these sources of data, this Study reveals the power 
                                                 
2 The decision to focus on trial courts rather than appellate courts resulted 
from the nature of the research questions.  First, because one of the goals of this 
Study was to examine the way courts approach said cases, from both a legal and a 
factual perspective, it was vital to zoom in on the first instance, where the facts are 
discussed in full, rather than examining whether the fact-finder had erred in its 
original decision.  Second, this choice also relied on the accepted notion that trial 
courts and appellate courts exercise their discretion differently, particularly due to 
the fact that trial courts can receive a direct impression of the characteristics of the 
parties, their versions, and the injuries sustained.  This had great significance for 
this Study, which aimed to examine the way trial courts respond in their decisions 
to plaintiffs’ features. 
3 The Study analyzed court decisions published in the “Nevo” commercial 
database (a total of 245 decisions).  “Nevo” was chosen as it is used by the Israeli 
Supreme Court, most leading law firms, and the Israeli Ministry of Justice (com-
parable to “LexisNexis”).  In order to control for errors that may exist in this data-
base and to ensure that all published cases would be examined, the Author con-
ducted searches in two other commercial databases (“Takdin” and “Pad’or”), 
used to a lesser degree in Israel.  Cases were retrieved from both the magistrate 
and the district courts dockets because both levels adjudicate claims at first in-
stance.  The time frame for the Research was defined as ten years before and after 
the 2002 Amendment, which was enacted in August 2002. 
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dynamic between the Israeli legislature and the lower courts adju-
dicating the difficult tort cases of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.  
The Study shows a judicial attempt to defend lower courts’ institu-
tional independence and preserve a discretionary space for decid-
ing cases, despite the legislature’s efforts to control judges’ deci-
sion-making process. 
 Section 2 begins by setting out the relevant legal and histori-
cal background regarding Palestinians’ tort claims against Israel 
for damages inflicted by IDF.  Section 3 proceeds with a review of 
the relevant scholarship, both American and Israeli, on the rela-
tionship between the judiciary and the legislature.  Section 4 is de-
voted to a quantitative content analysis of the decisions in ques-
tion.  This Section describes some of the prominent characteristics 
of the claims, and compares decision-making patterns before and 
after the legislative change of 2002.  Section 5 then provides a 
deeper look into issues invoked by the quantitative analysis, focus-
ing on areas of judicial decision-making in which courts enjoy con-
siderable discretion.  Finally, Section 6 discusses the findings of the 
Study, suggests inferences to derive from it, and raises questions 
for further research. 
 
2.  BACKGROUND:  FROM POLITICAL TURMOIL TO ANTI-PLAINTIFFS 
LEGISLATION 
 
The complex reality of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict creates 
frequent confrontations between Israel’s security forces, particular-
ly the IDF,4 on the one hand, and Palestinian residents of the Oc-
cupied Palestinian Territories (“OPT”)5 on the other hand.  These 
encounters often lead to property damage, personal injury, and 
even death of Palestinian civilians, at least some of whom were not 
involved in any hostilities.  Events range from accidental explosion 
of land mines, to use of riot control techniques during protest, to 
drone attacks and large scale military operations, particularly in 
                                                 
4 Israel’s security forces include IDF, police forces operating in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories (mostly through the Border Police Unit), and the General 
Security Service.  The Author focuses on IDF and military police activity in this 
Article, referred to jointly as IDF. 
5 For the sake of brevity, this Author shall hereinafter refer to the plaintiffs in 
the claims as “Palestinians.” 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss2/5
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the Gaza Strip, such as Operation Cast lead in 20082009.  These 
incidents give rise to the question of whether the State should be 
held liable in torts for injuries sustained by Palestinians due to IDF 
activities in the OPT, and if so, under which circumstancesa 
question which provokes turbulent political debate given its 
charged background.  This question arose in full force following 
the events of the First Intifada, which erupted in late 1987.6  As a 
result of Palestinians’ injuries in the events of the First Intifada, 
many lawsuits were filed with Israel’s national courts by plaintiffs 
claiming that the State was liable for their injuries (“the First Inti-
fada Claims”). 
In principle, Israeli tort law enables tort claims against the State 
for any wrongful act that its agents have committed, including IDF 
soldiers.7  This liability rule is established in the Civil Wrongs (Lia-
bility of the State) Law (“the Act”).8  Therefore, Palestinian victims 
of said confrontations were able to bring claims before Israeli civil 
courts.9  This, of course, raised questions concerning choice of law 
in the OPT, i.e. whether these lawsuits should be adjudicated ac-
cording to Israeli tort law.  Due to the special status of the OPT, the 
policy of the Israeli government and judiciary was to allow such 
                                                 
6 For a review of these events and their legal impact, see HCJ 8276/05 Adalah 
v. Government of Israel 62(1) PD 1 (2006) (Isr.) (in Hebrew). 
7 Initially, the Civil Wrongs Law did not include an explicit provision that 
tied State liability to that of its agents.  This created interpretive difficulties for the 
courts, and therefore, the Civil Wrongs Law was amended in 1985 (Amendment 
No. 3) to provide that when the State is immune from suit, so are its agents, and 
vice versa.  See Israel Gilead, Tort Liability of Public Authorities and Public Officials 
(Parts I and II), 2 MISHPAT U’MIMSHAL 339 (1994) (in Hebrew). 
8 Civil Wrongs (Liability of the State) Law, 5712–1952, § 3, 1 (as amended) 
(Isr.) [hereinafter “Civil Tort Act”], https://www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/
features/compensation/law-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LEY-HK82] (unofficial 
translation) (“The State is not civilly liable for an act done within the scope of law-
ful authority, or bona fide in the purported exercise of lawful authority; but it is 
liable for negligence in connection with such an act.”).   
9 Israeli trial courts are divided into two levels: Magistrate Courts, which in 
civil cases have jurisdiction over matters up to two and a half million (2,500,000) 
New Israeli Shekel (“NIS”) (approximately six hundred and fifty thousand 
(650,000) U.S. Dollars); and District Courts, which in civil cases have jurisdiction 
over cases in which more than two and a half million (2,500,000) NIS are in dis-
pute.  The district courts also hear appeals of judgments of the magistrate courts.  
In the context of this Article, both instances adjudicate cases of Palestinians’ tort 
claims against Israel, according to an estimated amount of damages assessed by 
plaintiffs. 
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claims without bars of jurisdiction, justiciability, and standing.10 
However, the Act lays down another hurdle in the path of Pal-
estinians seeking remedy.  According to the Act, “[t]he State is not 
civilly liable for an act done in the course of a combat action of the 
Israel Defense Forces.”11  The legal meaning of this immunity is 
that only in cases in which the action conducted by the IDF did not 
constitute a “Combat Action” should courts examine the validity of 
the claim based on the State’s fault.12 
The First Intifada Claims gave rise to the question of how to 
correctly interpret the term “Combat Action.”  According to Jacob, 
because the original version of the Act did not include a definition 
for the term, Israeli trial courts interpreted it to the best of their 
understanding.13  Jacob labeled the courts’ interpretations of 
“Combat Action” as either expansive or restrictive.  Although both 
interpretative trends held that Israeli authorities’ actions during 
the First Intifada could be protected by sovereign immunity, the 
tendency reflected in the expansive trend was to view most of 
these actions as “Combat Actions,” whereas the restrictive trend 
distinguished between “police work” and “Combat Action,” and 
sought to examine each case separately, according to its circum-
                                                 
10 For a detailed review of the issue, see Michael M. Karayanni, Choice of Law 
Under Occupation: How Israeli Law came to Serve Palestinian Plaintiffs, 5 J. PRIV. INT’L 
L. 1, 4 (2009) (discussing the development of Israeli choice-of-law rules in civil ac-
tions filed by Palestinian plaintiffs before Israeli courts when the cause of action 
was based in the OPT); MICHAEL M. KARAYANNI, CONFLICTS IN A CONFLICT: A 
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASE STUDY ON ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES (2014) 
(analyzing legal doctrines instructing Israeli courts for civil suits pertaining to the 
OPT from 1967 to present).  For the history and politics of this policy and its im-
plications on international law, see DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE: 
THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 1925 (2002) (dis-
cussing events that led to the Israeli Supreme Court’s position on jurisdiction, jus-
ticiability, and substantive norms concerning the Court’s power of review over 
actions in military areas not part of Israeli sovereign territory). 
11 Civil Tort Act, supra note 8, § 5 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).  
This constitutes an exception to the general rule set forth in Section 2, according to 
which the State will not be treated differently with regard to its liability in torts 
than any other incorporated entity.  See Id. § 2 (“For the purpose of civil liability, 
the State shall, save as hereinafter provided, be regarded as a corporate body.”).  
12 Tamar Gidron, Liability of the State and of Public Authorities in Negligence in 
Israel – A Slippery Slope, 51 HA’PRAKLIT L. REV. 443, 454 (2011) (in Hebrew) (ex-
plaining that there are instances in which there is actual harm to an individual but 
she cannot sue because the harm occurred during a military operation). 
13 Assaf Jacob, Immunity under Fire: Sovereign Immunity for Damage Caused by 
Combat Action, 33 MISHPATIM L. REV. 107, 15859 (2003) (in Hebrew). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss2/5
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stances.  This mixed approach allowed some Palestinian claimants 
to succeed in receiving remedy for their injuries from the State.14  
 Eventually, in Beni Uda v. The State of Israel (the “Beni Uda 
case”), this interpretive question reached the doorstep of the Israeli 
Supreme Court.15  In the Beni Uda case, IDF soldiers shot at Pales-
tinian fugitives, although they were not in danger.  The issue was 
whether this constituted “Combat Action.”  The Supreme Court 
held that the term “Combat Action” should be narrowly under-
stood, and it is necessary to distinguish between police-like activi-
ties and combatant actions undertaken by the IDF in the OPT.  The 
Court held that the matter should be decided on a case-by-case ba-
sis, and when the operation involved high levels of risk to IDF sol-
diers, actions directed against terrorist organizations could amount 
to combat actions in certain cases.  The Beni Uda case was not con-
sidered a case of “Combat Action.” 
Meanwhile, in September 2000, the events of the Second Intifa-
da began, causing numerous injuries to Palestinians and leading to 
a high volume of lawsuits against the State.16  Due to these events 
and the fact that the Israeli legislature (“Knesset”) was not satisfied 
with the interpretation given to the term “Combat Action” in the 
Beni Uda case, Amendment (No. 4) was enacted (“the 2002 
Amendment”). 
Under the 2002 Amendment, a definition was added to the 
term “Combat Action.” The definition contained actions against 
terrorist organizations, which “includes any action combating ter-
rorism, hostile acts, or insurrection, and also an action intended to 
prevent terrorism, hostile acts, or insurrection that is taken in a sit-
uation endangering life or limb.”17  The 2002 Amendment also 
added new articles which set forth special procedural arrange-
ments for claims arising from IDF actions in the OPT.  These in-
                                                 
14 See generally id. at 15963. 
15 CA 5964/92 Beni Uda v. The State of Israel 56(4) PD 1 (2002) (Isr.) (in He-
brew).  The Israeli Supreme Court has two major functions: it serves as an appellate 
court, and as the High Court of Justice.  In the Beni Uda case, the Supreme Court 
served as an appellate court for the district court’s adjudication of the claim. 
16 For a detailed review of the events of the Second Intifada, see Michele K. 
Esposito, The al-Aqsa Intifada: Military Operations, Suicide Attacks, Assassinations, 
and Losses in the First Four Years, 34 J. PALESTINE STUD. 85 (2005) (discussing mili-
tary operations, outbreak, losses, Palestinian suicide attacks, and Israeli assassina-
tions during the Second Intifada). 
17 Civil Tort Act, supra note 8, § 1. 
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cluded, for example, shortening the statute of limitations on such 
tort claims from seven to two years.18  The 2002 Amendment shift-
ed the focus of the adjudication process to the question of whether 
the IDF act was performed through a “Combat Action.”  This Arti-
cle examines, among other things, the extent to which this shift was 
successful. 
Although the Article is primarily concerned with the 2002 
Amendment, additional remarks are in order regarding the devel-
opments that followed its enactment.  Following the 2002 Amend-
ment, the Israeli government initiated another bill, further limiting 
state liability for Palestinians’ injuries caused by IDF actions.  
Amendment (No. 7) dealt with claims filed by residents of “conflict 
zones,”19 and provided that the State is not liable for any action 
taken by IDF within such zones, thus excluding claims by most 
Palestinians residing in the OPT.20  This Amendment was partially 
invalidated by the HCJ, which held that it disproportionately vio-
lated the right of Palestinians to compensation outside the scope of 
“Combat Action.”21   
Yet, the political process aimed at restricting the State’s liability 
for Palestinians’ injuries persisted, and Amendment (No. 8) was 
                                                 
18 Civil Tort Act, supra note 8, § 5A(3) (“The court shall not hear a claim filed 
more than two years from the day of the act that is the subject of the claim . . . .”).  
Additional important changes included: a requirement to submit a notice of claim 
within sixty days from the date of the incident, and a change in the standard of 
proof in these claims.  Id. §5A(2)(b)(c).  The Amendment stated that rules that 
shift the burden of proof to the defendant—in cases where the object which 
caused the injury was dangerous or when there exists factual vagueness with re-
gard to the circumstances which led to the injury—will not apply to the claims in 
question.  See Tort Ordinance (New Version), 57291968, §§ 38, 41 (as amended) 
(Isr.); Civil Tort Act, supra note 8, § 5A(4).  
19 Civil Tort Act, supra note 8, § 5C(e) (“‘Conflict Zone’—a zone outside the 
territory of the State of Israel, which the Minister of Defense has declared as set 
forth in subsection (c), in which the security forces acted or were present in the 
zone within the context of a conflict.”). 
20 Civil Tort Act, supra note 8, § 5C(a) (“Notwithstanding any other provision 
of law, the State shall not be subject to liability under the law of torts for damage 
sustained in a Conflict Zone due to an act performed by the security forces . . . .”).  
Additionally, Section 5B provided that the State is not liable for injury sustained 
by an enemy state national, by a person who is an active member of a terrorist or-
ganization, or by a person injured while acting as an agent of these entities.  Id. § 
5B(a)(1)(3).  Note, Section 5B was upheld by the Supreme Court in Adalah v. 
Government of Israel.  HCJ 8276/05 Adalah v. Government of Israel 62(1) PD 1 
(2006) (Isr.) (in Hebrew). 
21 HCJ 8276/05 Adalah v. Government of Israel 62(1) PD 1 (2006) (Isr.) (in 
Hebrew). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss2/5
  
2017] POWER DYNAMICS IN PALESTINIANS’ TORT CLAIMS 587 
 
enacted in 2012 (“the 2012 Amendment”).22  Though the 2012 
Amendment pays lip service to the HCJ’s judgment, by removing 
the invalidated article, in effect, it attempts to reverse the ruling, 
replacing case-by-case analysis with the use of sweeping exemp-
tion categories and restating the essence of the 2005 Amendment.23  
It also places additional procedural hurdles for Palestinians victims 
seeking a remedy.24  Lastly, as of July 2014, Gaza Strip residents are 
no longer eligible to bring tort claims against Israel, as the Gaza 
Strip was declared “enemy territory” by the Israeli Prime Minis-
ter.25 
This brief review of the Act’s legislative history calls for the 
topic addressed in this Article, namely how the relationship be-
tween the Knesset and Israel’s civil courts is reflected in court deci-
sions in the tort claims in question, specifically focusing on the im-
pact of the 2002 Amendment.26  The Article sheds light on a 
relatively neglected phenomenon among legal scholarsthe poli-
tics of judicial decision-making on the trial court level.  This Au-
thor suggests that the dynamics between the courts and the Knes-
set have had a deep impact on civil litigation within the Conflict, 
and are therefore important to explore.  Furthermore, the discus-
                                                 
22 Civil Wrongs (Liability of the State) Law (Amendment No. 8), 57682008, 
(Isr.) [hereinafter “Civil Tort Act (Amendment No. 8)”], http://
www.hamoked.org/files/2011/9083_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/DBG3-3TAN] 
(unofficial translation). 
23 Ido Rosenzweig & Yuval Shany, Definition of “Combat Action” in Civil Tort 
Law (Liability of the State), 10 TERRORISM & DEMOCRACY (2009), http://
en.idi.org.il/analysis/terrorism-and-democracy/issue-no-10,-october-2009/
definition-of-combat-action-in-civil-tort-law-(liability-of-the-state)/ [https://
perma.cc/6GVM-XVEW] (analyzing the 2012 Amendment and suggesting it es-
sentially overrides the Court's ruling in the Adalah case).    
24 Among other changes implemented by the 2012 Amendment, it requires 
courts to decide on “Combat Action” immunity claims as a preliminary plea; it 
expands the exemption of Article 5B to apply to residents of enemy territory; and 
it holds that the assessment of compensation will be conducted according to 
standards applicable in the place of residence of the plaintiff, thus inherently lim-
iting the prospective amount of damages for Palestinians.  Civil Tort Act 
(Amendment No. 8), supra note 22, § 24.  For more on these restrictions, see Gilat 
Bachar, Access Denied – Using Procedure to Restrict Tort Litigation: the Israeli-
Palestinian Experience, 92(3) CHIC.-KENT L. REV. (Forthcoming, 2017) (exploring the 
various barriers Palestinians face in bringing tort claims against the Israeli gov-
ernment). 
25 Civil Tort Ordinance (Liability of the State) (Declaration of Enemy Territo-
ry – the Gaza Strip), 7431-2014, (Isr.). 
26 Since the time frame for the Study stops at 2012, the impact of the 2012 
Amendment is beyond the scope of this Study. 
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sion bears implications for the study of the potential role of mone-
tary awards granted by states as a mechanism for dealing with ci-
vilians’ injuries,27 which is yet to be fully developed in the context 
of ethno-national conflicts.28  With this background in mind, the 
next Section describes the relevant scholarship on legislature-
courts dynamics in the United States and in Israel. 
 
                                                 
27 This issue has been dealt with in various contexts, such as compensation 
for injuries inflicted by terrorism acts, crime, and war.  See Deborah R. Hensler, 
Money Talks: Searching for Justice Through Compensation for Personal Injury and 
Death, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 417, 418 (2003) (exploring tort compensation surround-
ing the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks); Liesbeth Hulst & Arno J. Akkermans, 
Can Money Symbolize Acknowledgment?  How Victims’ Relatives Perceive Monetary 
Awards for Their Emotional Harm, 4 PSYCHOL. INJ. & L. 245, 245 (2011), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3267030/ [https://perma.cc/
96JC-RXM9] (comparing tort compensation for emotional harm suffered by close 
family members of crime or accident victims in different legal systems); Yael Ro-
nen, Avoid or Compensate?  Liability for Incidental Injury to Civilians Inflicted During 
Armed Conflict, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 181, 183 (2009) (discussing injury or 
death “as incidental outcomes of military attack” as a result of new military technolo-
gy and changes in warfare and the role of compensation in addressing such harm 
to civilians).  
28 But there is a rich scholarship in social psychology that deals with the psy-
chological dynamics of ethno-national conflicts, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
in particular.  See Nadim N. Rouhana & Daniel Bar-Tal, Psychological Dynamics of 
Intractable Ethnonational Conflicts: The Israeli-Palestinian Case, 53 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 
761, 761 (1998), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/232522388_
Psychological_Dynamics_of_Intractable_Ethnonational_Conflicts_The_Israeli-
Palestinian_Case [https://perma.cc/4UZJ-LFZR] (arguing that some ethnona-
tional conflicts have characteristics that increase their resistance to change, and 
that societies in such conflicts form societal beliefs that, on the one hand, help 
them cope with the stressful conditions of the conflicts but, on the other hand, 
perpetuate the conflicts); Byron Bland, Brenna Powell & Lee Ross, Barriers to Dis-
pute Resolution: Reflections on Peacemaking and Relationships Between Adversaries, in 
UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL ACTION, PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS 265 (Ryan Goodman, 
Derek Jinks & Andrew K. Woods eds., 2012) (discussing psychological barriers to 
conflict resolution in intergroup conflicts, such as the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict).  
One question which arises from these works is what can be done to address the 
societal beliefs acquired by Palestinian and Israeli societies as a result of the Con-
flict.  However, exploring the potential role of monetary compensation in post-
conflict reconciliation is beyond the scope of this Research. 
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3.  LEGISLATURE-COURT DYNAMICS AND THE INTERPRETATION OF 
NEW LEGISLATION 
 
3.1.  Congress-Judiciary Relations in the United States – Comparative 
Observations 
 
 The complex relationship between the judicial branch and 
the legislature in the United States has long been acknowledged, 
and has been the subject of abundant scholarship.  For the purpose 
of this Article, which cannot encompass this extensive writing, the 
Author focuses on one key aspect of the literature: potential expla-
nations to courts’ interaction with the legislature through statutory 
interpretation, with a particular eye towards the way in which 
courts implement a legislative change.29 
Over the years, various answers have been given and different 
research models developed in response to the question of what 
comprises judges’ considerations when deciding disputes.  The last 
several decades have seen a shift from the legal formalism of the ear-
ly 19th century, which believed in the judge’s ability to place facts 
into a mathematical-like formula and calculate the “correct” legal 
result,30 to the attitudinal model first introduced in the 1960s.  Ac-
                                                 
29 By doing so, the Author focuses on models of judicial decision-making that 
assume rationality among judges, as opposed to another important school of 
thought for studying judicial decision-making, through cognitive psychology and 
behavioral theory.  According to the latter, judges, as human beings, are suscepti-
ble to the distortive, unconscious effects of interrelated cognitive biases and psy-
chological phenomena, which impact their decision-making.  See Eyal Zamir & 
Ilana Ritov, Loss Aversion, Omission Bias, and the Burden of Proof in Civil Litigation, 
41 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 165 (2012) (discussing omission bias as a reason for the ac-
tual standard of proof in civil litigation to exceed fifty-one percent, higher than 
the formal rule of preponderance of evidence); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn 
Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect 
Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1195 (2009), 
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/786/?utm_source=scholarship.law.co
rnell.edu%2Ffacpub%2F786&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPag
es [https://perma.cc/7ZUQ-SBAS] (asserting that judges harbor implicit biases 
affecting judgment).  
30 See Karen Weinshall-Margel, Attitudinal and Neo-Institutional Models of Su-
preme Court Decision Making: An Empirical and Comparative Perspective from Israel, 8 
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 556, 557 (2011) (“The legal model evolved and was re-
fined from the legal formalism of the early 19th century, which viewed legal logic 
as an inner perfection unto itself, and believed in the judge's ability to place facts 
into a mathematical-like formula and calculate the ‘correct’ legal result.” (citing 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
  
590  U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:2 
 
cording to the attitudinal model, which developed with the rise of 
the behavioralist approach to political science and realist legal the-
ories, the law is intended to no more than camouflage justices’ 
genuine considerations and grant legitimacy to their decisions.31  
Since these early days, though, scholars have tweaked the basic no-
tion of the attitudinal model, creating a more nuanced understand-
ing of judicial decision-making.32 
Attempts to analyze the strategic interactions between courts 
and legislatures typically use an individualistic approach; that is, 
an approach which views courts or judges as having an independ-
ent political agenda.  These studies combine judges’ preferences 
and strategies with extra-judicial influences, to explain the ways in 
which institutional structures shape judicial policy.33  From this 
perspective, Supreme Court justices may certainly have interests 
independent of those shared by certain social groups.  In this con-
text, rational choice theory views Supreme Court justices as players 
who act strategically to advance their policy goals and, in order to 
minimize the possibility of congressional override, may adjust the 
Supreme Court’s doctrinal positions and may not vote according to 
                                                                                                               
Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate In-
terdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251 (1997))).  
31 Id. at 558 (“[V]oices began to be heard calling for a new, neo-institutional 
approach to judiciary politics studies. These voices advocated changing the re-
search focus from the policy preferences of particular judges to the characteristics 
of the court as an institution, its relationship with other political institutions, and 
how this affects and shapes justices’ policy preferences.”). See generally WALTER F. 
MURPHY, CHARLES HERMAN PRITCHETT, LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, COURTS, 
JUDGES, AND POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (6th ed., 2006) 
(discussing, inter alia, U.S. judicial decision-making); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD 
J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002) (as-
serting that judges are policy makers who decide often based on personal policy 
preferences). 
32 Weinshall-Margel, supra note 30, at 558 (“[A] judge’s decision is influenced 
not only by institutional restrictions and the sense of danger in deciding based 
solely on his or her priorities, but also by the sense of obligation to act according 
to the law.”).  
33 For reviews of the various studies and approaches which comprise this lit-
erature, see Weinshall-Margel, supra note 30; Assaf Meydani & Shlomo Mizrahi, 
The Relationship Between the Supreme Court and Parliament in Light of the Theory of 
Moves: The Case of Israel, 22 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 55, 62 (2010), 
http://is.muni.cz/el/1422/jaro2013/MVV2868K/um/MEYDANI_MIZRAHI_-
_ISC_vs._Parliament_in_Light_of_the_Theory_of_Moves.pdf [https://perma.cc/
E3DE-Z7KH] (discussing different studies that analyze Supreme Court behavior 
from an individualistic or rational choice perspective).  
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their sincere preferences.34  In contrast, the neo-institutionalist ap-
proach views judges as interested in preserving their organization’s 
power and authority.35  Eskridge, for example, argues that current 
legislative expectations are usually more important to the Court 
than original legislative intent.36  In this context, some scholars 
suggest viewing judicial activism as a strategic move which at-
tempts to increase the Supreme Court’s independence and 
strengthen the norms derived from its rulings.37     
This body of research supports the view that political discourse 
may well affect judicial decision-making.  It gives a sound founda-
tion, both theoretical and empirical, to the fact that the relationship 
between supreme courts and legislatures is taken into account by 
both these entities.  It also underpins the view of supreme courts as 
attempting to maintain their institutional independence and stance 
vis-à-vis legislatures through their decisions while trying to remain 
within the boundaries of public opinion.  However, missing in this 
                                                 
34 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge Jr., Reneging on History?: Playing the 
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 613, 61617 (1991), 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/3835/?utm_source=digitalcom
mons.law.yale.edu%2Ffss_papers%2F3835&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=
PDFCoverPages [https://perma.cc/37WQ-AZDR].  
35 See, e.g., Albert Breton, Organizational Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: An Inte-
grative Essay, 11 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 411, (1995), http://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/017626809500011L [https://perma.cc/JRH4-DFNC] (discuss-
ing organizational agency issues within bureaucracies). 
36 William N. Eskridge Jr., Overriding Supreme Court's Statutory Interpretation 
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 415 (1991), http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4816&context=fss_papers [https://perma.cc/6CVG-
MZE7] (“This study suggests . . . that current legislative expectations are usually 
more important to the Court than original legislative expectations.”).  
37 See Omri Yadlin, Judicial Discretion and Judicial Activism as a Strategic Game, 
19 BAR-ILAN UNI. L. REV. 665 (2003) (in Hebrew) (comparing judicial activism in 
the House of Lords in England, the United States Supreme Court and the Israeli 
Supreme Court.). For empirical research testing these theories, see, e.g., Robert D. 
Cooter & Tom Ginsburg, Comparative Judicial Discretion: An Empirical Test of Eco-
nomic Models, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 295, 29596 (1996), http://
www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/014481889600018X [https://
perma.cc/3JWU-DXBT] (addressing the question of how much discretion judges 
have interpreting statutes and offering a game theory model directed towards ap-
proaching the problem.  According to the authors' analysis, judges are constrained 
by the possibility of legislative reversal of decisions, so the space for judicial dis-
cretion expands as overriding the court becomes more difficult); Pablo T. Spiller & 
Rafael Gely, Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. 
Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988, 23 RAND J. ECON. 463, 463 (1992) 
(developing an econometric model to explore Supreme Court decision-making 
subject to the constraints of Congress and the president). 
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scholarship are the trial courts: do they interact in a similar manner 
with the legislature when deciding politically-charged cases?  And 
if so, what are their motivations?  This issue has attracted signifi-
cantly less attention in the scholarship.38  
That is not to say that the analysis of lower courts’ decision-
making in the context of statutory interpretation has been com-
pletely absent from current scholarship.39  The empirical writing in 
this field occasionally analyzes judicial decision-making in lower 
state and federal courts, and examines judges’ approaches to statu-
tory interpretation.40  This literature has also recognized political 
incentives that drive lower court judges, primarily those related ei-
ther to judges’ partisan loyalty or to the effects of periodic review 
of judges who stand for reelection.41  Yet such writing generally 
does not deal directly with the dialogue between these courts and 
the legislature as manifested in judicial opinions.  Rather, it focuses 
on statutory interpretation or on sentencing decisions by lower 
courts, in consideration of their own goals and aspirations or vis-à-
vis norms established by the Supreme Court.42 
                                                 
38 Friedman, supra note 1, at 265 (“Many of the political science studies focus 
on the Supreme Court. But if constraint is the issue, all the important action might 
be in the lower courts.”). 
39 For work not only looking at the interaction between the three branches 
with regard to statutory interpretation, but also dedicating some attention to low-
er courts in this context, see LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: 
INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS (2d ed. 2014). 
40 An interesting example is the extensive work done on product liability law 
in a variety of U.S. states.  Henderson & Eisenberg used appellate and trial court 
decisions to show that changes in judicial decision-making are occurring, and that 
current trends show defendants as the favored parties.  Another inference from 
their research is that the legislature’s action in this field was unnecessary, as it has 
been preempted by a change, which already gradually took place in the judicial 
approach. See James A. Henderson Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution 
in Products Liability, 20 ANGLO.-AM. L. REV. 188, 189 (1991) (explaining how the 
roots of the judicial lawmaking trend in the products liability sphere began in the 
early 1980s, after which the legislature sought to rein in defendant-favoring doc-
trines with post-hoc legislation).  
41 See, e.g., Claire S.H. Lim, Preferences and Incentives of Appointed and Elected 
Public Officials: Evidence from State Trial Court Judges, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 1360, 1360 
(2013) (studying the influence of election systems on state court judges and their 
criminal sentencing decisions); Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accounta-
bility and Coercion: Is Justice Blind When It Runs for Office? 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 
247-48 (2004) (developing and testing a theory specifying the conditions under 
which trial judges will alter their sentencing behavior to improve their electoral 
prospects). 
42 As for the latter, recently published work had looked at the way lower 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss2/5
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When it comes to research that specifically concerns the influ-
ence of a legislative change on lower courts’ decisions, scholars 
have concentrated on examining the effective outcomes of such al-
terations in the governing law on the specific topic of interest,43 ra-
ther than on judiciary-legislature dynamics reflected in the deci-
sions.44  This work nevertheless provides important background 
for judiciary-legislature dynamics, as it asserts the notion that 
courts react in their decision-making to legislative attempts to limit 
their discretion. 
One example worth mentioning on statutory interpretation 
trends in lower courts is a study conducted by James Nehf.45  Nehf 
argues that the current debate over interpretive theory will lose 
momentum if the focus continues to be solely on theories derived 
from Supreme Court decisions, since that Court’s role is concerned 
more with constitutional interpretation, and the decision-making 
process is markedly different in other courts.  Nehf’s findings show 
a strong tendency in lower courts of relying on textual sources for 
statutory interpretation, and suggest that such methods allow for 
extremely flexible interpretations, where courts can justify virtually 
                                                                                                               
courts respond to changes in the Supreme Court’s rules of statutory interpreta-
tion. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Communicating the Canons: How Lower Courts Re-
act When the Supreme Court Changes the Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 100 MINN. 
L. REV. 481, 483 (2015) (considering “the relationship between the Supreme 
Court’s methodological practices . . . and the behavior of other courts”). 
43 See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: 
Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471 
(1987–1988) (specifically examining the impact of legislative changes on juvenile 
courts). 
44 A rare example can be found in a study on the effects on decision-making 
when judicial discretion in criminal sentencing is confined.  It has been suggested 
that courts should beware of light sentencing, especially in high-profile cases, as 
this may provoke Congress to start down the mandatory minimum road, thus 
confining their discretion.  See Daniel A. Chatham, Playing with Post-Booker Fire: 
The Dangers of Increased Judicial Discretion in Federal White Collar Sentencing, 32 J. 
CORP. L. 619, 619 (2006) (analyzing federal sentencing reform in white collar crime 
cases, and the possibility of imposing mandatory minimums for certain corporate 
crimes). Despite differences in context and method, the conclusions of this re-
search are important for this Study: a statutory reform aimed at changing courts’ 
case law and affecting their scope of discretion. 
45 See James P. Nehf, Textualism in the Lower Courts: Lessons from Judges Inter-
preting Consumer Legislation, 26 RUTGERS L. J. 1, 3-5 (1994) (arguing that present 
scholarship regarding interpretive theory focuses on Supreme Court decisions as 
the principal resource due to two main reasons: first, a premise that such deci-
sions represent the hardest, and therefore most interesting, cases; and second, a 
bias among academics as a result of their past as Supreme Court clerks).  
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any decision they desire.  These findings reflect reasoning methods 
used by lower court judges when implementing legislation with 
which they do not necessarily agree.  Nehf’s study thus stresses the 
importance of analyzing lower court decisions in the field of statu-
tory implementation. 
 
3.2.  Knesset-Judiciary Relations in Israel 
 
This Section briefly outlines the literature on the relations be-
tween the judiciary and the political system in Israel against the 
backdrop of Israel’s unique institutional structure.46  In Israeli 
scholarship, much like in U.S. scholarship, the focus in this area 
had been almost exclusively on the Supreme Court—its status, in-
terests, and interaction with the Knesset.  Very few studies have 
looked at, or even mentioned, lower courts in this context. 
For many years, a single majority party controlled the Israeli 
parliament, and the judiciary was relatively passive.  The jurispru-
dence of these years expresses a belief in strict separation of pow-
ers between the Knesset and the courts.47  However, since the 
1970s, the Israeli Supreme Court has assumed a more active role in 
criticizing state actions.  The Court has increased its involvement in 
political decisions, and intensified its level of judicial review of 
statutes.48  In developing a rich jurisprudence on political and civil 
                                                 
46 See Gad Barzilai, Courts as Hegemonic Institutions: The Israeli Supreme Court 
in a Comparative Perspective, 5 ISR. AFF. 15, 31 (1998) (describing the Israeli Supreme 
Court in light of Israeli politics and global trends); Yoav Dotan, Judicial Rhetoric, 
Government Lawyers, and Human Rights: The Case of the Israeli High Court of Justice 
during the Intifada, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 319, 320 (1999) (arguing that evaluating 
judicial rhetoric and out-of-court practices and procedures can point to conclu-
sions about Israeli institutions). 
47 MENACHEM MAUTNER, LAW AND THE CULTURE OF ISRAEL 75-90 (2011) (argu-
ing that this approach enabled the legal community to maintain and develop the 
evolving values of Israeli law, which were in tension with, if not contradiction to, 
some of the central values of the hegemonic culture); see generally SHIMON 
SHETREET, JUSTICE IN ISRAEL: A STUDY OF THE ISRAELI JUDICIARY (1994) (studying the 
revolution regarding the role played by the judiciary, particularly the Supreme 
Court in Israeli society and the system of government). 
48 This process was largely attributed to the growing impact of liberal values 
within Israeli political culture, combined with the absence of a written constitu-
tion in a highly polarized and fragmented society.  Some scholars also connect it 
to the divided structure of Israeli politics.  The deepening social rift and the de-
crease in the public’s regard towards politicians’ credibility have led the Court to 
be considered not only the most reliable institution in the country, but also the on-
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rights, the Court has intervened in socio-political and governmen-
tal policies.49  In most cases, the Knesset chose not to exercise its 
formal authority and accepted the Court’s rulings, thereby increas-
ing the Supreme Court’s power at the expense of the Knesset’s sta-
tus.50  This process has turned the Supreme Court into one of the 
most significant and powerful players in politics and society in Is-
rael.51 
One key question in this scholarship is what drives the Court in 
resolving disputes that are intimately related to political issues.  
Three main emphases in the Court’s motives can be identified in 
the scholarship:  social values and partisan-structural factors;52 re-
                                                                                                               
ly institution capable of addressing social and political conflicts.  One way in 
which the Court went about widening its role in Israeli society was by interpret-
ing legal terms such as “standing” and “justiciability” in a broad fashion, thus al-
lowing it to take an active part in all walks of social and political life in Israel. See 
MAUTNER, supra note 47, at 90–145 (recounting historical events that led to the 
Court’s role in Israeli society). See also Daphne Barak-Erez, Broadening the Scope of 
Judicial Review in Israel: Between Activism and Restraint, 3 INDIAN. J. CONS. L. 118, 118 
(2009) (assessing the developments and doctrinal changes that led to the expan-
sion of judicial review involving the Israeli Supreme Court); Barzilai, supra note 
46, at 18 (describing how the active judicial review in Israel might mean the State 
is better defined as a “judicial-administrative regime.”). 
49 See Yoav Dotan, Do the “Haves” Still Come Out Ahead? Resource Inequalities 
in Ideological Courts: The Case of the Israeli High Court of Justice, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
1059, 1064 (1999) (describing how the Court has developed rich jurisprudence in 
political rights and intervened in governmental policies on many occasions). 
50 See ASSAF MEYDANI, THE ISRAELI SUPREME COURT AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION: COURTS AS AGENDA SETTERS 3 (2011) (explaining how the relationship 
between the Court and the parliament was transformed, leading to a change re-
garding the “who governs?” rule). See also EDELMAN, infra note 60, at 12 (suggest-
ing that the fact that courts impose only the most basic, most widely accepted val-
ues of natural justice precludes the Knesset’s reversal). 
51 See Barzilai, supra note 46, at 19-20 (theorizing that the increased judicial 
activism of the Court is due in part to increased public reliance as a result of lack 
of confidence in the political institutions).  However, this process has also invoked 
much controversy.  A key critique, made by Ruth Gavison, suggests that in rifted 
democracies such as Israel, courts should be reluctant to intervene in political pri-
orities, especially in areas of social controversy.  According to Gavison, such de-
terminations should be left to the political branches, while the courts should con-
centrate on defending individuals against the clear violation of basic rights and 
the conditions necessary for effective democracy.  Ruth Gavison, The Role of Courts 
in Rifted Democracies, 33 ISR. L. REV. 216, 227 (1999).  Gavison's view has gained 
traction in Israeli politics in recent years. 
52 See, e.g., Barzilai, supra note 46, at 25 (stating partisan, self-interested insti-
tutions as adding to a sense of legitimacy).  In contrast to the U.S. system, Israel 
has a parliamentary system with relatively strong party control over its members, 
which in turn affects the relationship between the Knesset and the courts. 
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lations and interests among the ruling elite;53 and cultural factors.54  
Some scholars have stressed the Court’s interests in preserving its 
judicial independence and its institutional stance against the legis-
lature, as is seen in U.S. literature.55  Along the same lines, other 
scholars suggest that the Court’s intervention in political issues is a 
means of establishing judges as “experts” who determine the ex-
tent to which a certain political decision is reasonable.56  Both these 
views represent the abovementioned individualistic approach.  A 
different view is posited by Mautner, who contends that the Court 
has been a channel for specific groups in Israeli society to advance 
their liberal values over those held by other sectors.57  Indeed, the 
literature provides various explanations to the behavior of the 
Court in its relationship with the Knesset and different answers as 
to whether the Court is only interested in protecting its institution-
al status, or also seeks to promote a value-based agenda that might 
clash with the goals of the legislature.  However, this scholarship 
                                                 
53 See, e.g., EVA ETZIONI-HALEVY, A PLACE AT THE TOP: ELITES AND ELITISM IN 
ISRAEL (1997). 
54 See, e.g., MAUTNER, supra note 47, at 7980 (arguing that “throughout Isra-
el’s six decades of statehood,” cultural paradigms regarding issues like human 
rights have influenced the Court’s promotion of a more liberal system).  This, of 
course, is merely a rough distinction since some of the works in this field, such as 
Mautner’s, combine different types of factors which influence judiciary-Knesset 
relations. 
55 See Barzilai, supra note 46, at 28 (discussing how the Israeli Supreme Court 
began exercising a supervisory function over Knesset legislation and nullify laws 
not aligned with Israel’s status as a democratic and Jewish state); see also PATRICIA 
J. WOODS, JUDICIAL POWER AND NATIONAL POLITICS: COURTS AND GENDER IN THE 
RELIGIOUS-SECULAR CONFLICT IN ISRAEL 8 (2008) (alteration in original) (“[W]hen 
courts challenge other state institutions, and particularly when they challenge 
administrative power in favor of individual rights, they may experience the most 
dramatic gains in judicial power.  When courts increase judicial power in this 
way, they may be demonstrating a substantively new type of judicial independ-
ence associated with high degrees of judicial power.”).  
56 Ronen Shamir, The Politics of Reasonability: Discretion as Judicial Power, 5 
THEORY & CRITICISM 7 (1994) (in Hebrew) (discussing the increasing involvement 
of the Israeli Supreme Court in public life). 
57 See MAUTNER, supra note 47, at 75 (arguing that a significant shift in the 
Court’s jurisprudence was “the shift from the Court’s view of itself as a profes-
sional institution whose role is to settle disputes, to a view of itself as a political 
institution that participates in determining the values that prevail in the country 
and the distribution of its material resources”); see also Bryna Bogoch & Yifat 
Holzman-Gazit, Mutual Bonds: Media Frames and the Israeli High Court of Justice, in 
LAW IN MANY SOCIETIES 3133 (Lawrence M. Friedman, Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo & 
Manuel A. Gómez eds., 2011) (suggesting an analysis that factors in media por-
trayal of Court decisions within the context of endorsing specific ideologies). 
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almost entirely ignores Israel’s lower courts, which deal with polit-
ically-charged controversies on a daily basis.   
Nevertheless, the dominant focus on the fundamental features 
of the dynamic between the Court and the Knesset may assist our 
study of lower courts.  The important role of the Court in Israeli 
society establishes the backdrop against which the judicial and the 
legislative branches interact.  More specifically, given the influence 
of the Court on the legal system as a whole, which stems in large 
part from Israel’s common law tradition and the role of precedents, 
the described dynamic may affect the relationship between trial 
courts and Knesset as well, when applying the necessary changes.  
Building on these foundations, this Article seeks to expand the cur-
rent literature by empirically examining the role trial courts as-
sume in adjudicating socially and politically complex cases. 
This Article is especially concerned with trial judges’ responses 
to a legislative change aimed at limiting their discretion.  In this 
sense, the analysis of judiciary-Knesset relations in Israel builds on 
research examining the effect of changes in legislation on the judi-
cial approach to statute interpretation.58  In this context, Levinson-
Zamir addressed the implications of the enactment of Basic Law:  
Human Dignity and Liberty, which includes the protection of the 
right to property, on courts’ interpretation of expropriation stat-
utes.  Since prior to the enactment of the Basic Law the right to 
property was already acknowledged as constitutional, Levinson-
Zamir did not expect to find a significant change following the 
Basic Law’s promulgation.  However, she found the new legisla-
tion actually had a profound effect on judges’ approach to expro-
priation cases, particularly on district court judges.59  Although her 
analysis is mostly doctrinal, and the evidentiary support is anecdo-
tal, her study points to the potential psychological influence a 
change in the governing legislation may have on judicial decision-
making, especially at the lower levels.   
 
                                                 
58 For background on this issue, see generally ASSAF MEYDANI & SHLOMO 
MIZRAHI, PUBLIC POLICY – BETWEEN SOCIETY AND LAW (2006) (in Hebrew). 
59 Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Constitutional Protection of Property in Land and 
the Law of Expropriation, in ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOSHUA WEISMAN 375 (2002) (in 
Hebrew); see also Baruch Bracha, Judicial Review of Security Powers in Israel: A New 
Policy of the Courts, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39, 41 (1991) (reviewing methods used by 
the Court to implement a new policy for reviewing exercise of emergency powers 
by Israeli security authorities). 
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3.3.  The Missing Piece: The Rest of the Court System 
 
Current scholarship has established the existence of an ongoing 
conversation between supreme courts and legislatures both in the 
United States and in Israel.  This research has used the back and 
forth dialogue between these entities about legislation as evidence 
of power dynamics and has emphasized the Supreme Court’s in-
terests, either in maintaining its judicial independence and power 
vis-à-vis the legislature, or in promoting social values. 
The relative lack of attention given to lower courts’ interaction 
with legislatures raises the question:  Are these courts worth study-
ing?  And if so, why?  Several intertwined considerations make 
lower courts an important area for research in this context.  First, 
the high volume of cases they handle as well as the serious practi-
cal consequences of their decisions for the parties in-
volvedespecially in volatile contexts like the one discussed 
hereturn them into important actors in the political space sur-
rounding the disputes.  In the context discussed here, the core of 
the legal activity is done at the trial court level, whereas only few 
cases make it to the Supreme Court on appeal.  Second, lower 
courts often possess a variety of legal tools for statutory interpreta-
tion, which allow them to use their discretion in flexible, diverse 
ways.  The use of these methods is particularly intriguing when it 
comes to navigating politically-charged cases.  For all these rea-
sons, this Study chooses to focus on these courts. 
One of the few references to the civil court system as a whole in 
the literature on judiciary-legislature relations in Israel can be 
found in the work of Edelman.  Edelman contends that the system 
has undergone a process similar to that of the Supreme Court, 
gradually accumulating authority and considerable political pow-
er.60  This statement calls for empirical examination that asks 
whether these courts have indeed taken a path similar to the Su-
preme Court’s in addressing politically-charged disputes, and if so, 
were they driven by the aspiration to protect their judicial inde-
pendence vis-à-vis the Knesset, or were other interests involved?  
                                                 
60 MARTIN EDELMAN, COURTS, POLITICS AND CULTURE IN ISRAEL 4447 (1994) 
(arguing civil courts have come to be seen as objective, fair institutions “by em-
phasizing the rights of citizens and other residents who have come into conflict 
with governmental agencies,” thereby playing an increasingly important role in 
Israeli society).   
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These questions remain unanswered by the current literature.  This 
Article contributes to closing this gap by examining the case of tort 
lawsuits brought by Palestinians against Israel.  The Article strives 
to better explain the behavior of trial court judges, arguing they 
should be viewed as political players holding an institutional 
agenda vis-à-vis the Knesset.  By so doing, the Article offers new 
insights on judiciary-legislature relations in Israel. 
 
4.  QUANTITATIVE ASPECTS OF PALESTINIANS’ TORT CLAIMS AGAINST 
ISRAEL 
 
“The court does not engage in the political aspects of the Intifada . . . 
the role of the court is to deal with a specific set of facts brought before it 
in the case in question and with the extent to which this set of facts estab-
lishes or does not establish liability.” 
  Abu-Shmalla v. The State of Israel61 
 
“The courts are thrown into this political commotion and are not sure 
how to swallow the beast.” 
 Advocate Abu-Hussein62 
 
This Study is aimed at examining the impact of the 2002 
Amendment on Israeli trial courts’ case law, and the political pow-
er dynamics reflected in that case law.  The 2002 Amendment 
changed the Act in two main ways.  First, the Amendment defined 
the term “Combat Action,” which significantly expanded the scope 
of sovereign immunity, thus restricting the State’s liability for inju-
ries caused by IDF actions.  Importantly, the immunity provided 
by the Act means that only where IDF action did not constitute 
“Combat Action” should the courts examine the validity of the 
claim on the merits.  Second, the Amendment shortened the limita-
tions period on tort claims filed on the grounds of IDF actions from 
seven to two years.63 
The Study analyzed court decisionsN=245, where N is the 
                                                 
61 CC (TA) 69946/93 Abu-Shmalla v. The State of Israel (1999) (Isr.) (finding 
for plaintiff). 
62 Interview with Adv. Hussein Abu-Hussein (Dec. 17, 2012). 
63 Other procedural changes were implemented in the 2002 Amendment, in-
cluding on burden of proof issues.  See supra Section 2, Civil Tort Act, notes 8, 18. 
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number of court decisions analyzedrendered by district and 
magistrate courts between 1992 and 2012ten years before and af-
ter the 2002 Amendmentin tort claims filed by Palestinians 
against Israel due to IDF actions in the OPT.  While the first decade 
saw courts ruling for plaintiffs in 39% of the cases, over the second 
decade this figure dropped to only 17%.  In the same vein, whereas 
before 2002 only one decision rested solely on statute of limitations 
and no cases were dismissed exclusively due to sovereign immuni-
ty, these rationales became dramatically more prevalent after 2002.  
This seemingly supports the conclusion that Israeli trial courts 
have been heavily influenced by the 2002 Amendment, which in 
turn was inspired by the escalation of the Conflict.64 
However, the data gathered in this Study allowed for a deeper 
look into the adjudication process.  This inquiry revealed surpris-
ing patterns in the proState versus proplaintiff framework, 
which sometimes pulled in different directions.  It revealed the 
courts’ insistence on delving into the details of IDF conduct, adju-
dicating the claims on the merits, and defying the attempt to con-
fine their discretion to issues of immunity and statute of limita-
tions.  One way this was expressed was by courts maintaining the 
tradition of comprehensive decisions that delve into specific cir-
cumstances and preserving “pockets” of judicial discretion, such as 
a lenient approach towards plaintiffs in costs orders. 
Thus, at least until 2012,65 a considerable amount of discretion 
still existed for courts adjudicating the claims, allowing more scru-
tiny of IDF actions that result in Palestinian injuries than the legis-
lature contemplated.  Whether these trends are a sign of a judiciary 
merely protecting its stance vis-à-vis the Knesset’s attempts to limit 
its discretion, or rather an endeavor to preserve judicial independ-
ence in order to act as the State’s “conscience” in certain cases, is 
hard to say.  Nonetheless, the data clearly show that when examin-
ing the judicial opinions as a whole, rather than only the outcomes 
                                                 
64 The Study does not control for other political and military events which 
occurred in the examined period.  Therefore, it may be argued that some of these 
findings reflect the escalation of the Conflict rather than the legislative change.  
Yet, the 2002 Amendment and the status of the Conflict are in many ways two 
sides to the same coina legislative process which reacted to historical and politi-
cal circumstancesand are therefore inseparable.  Changes in judicial decision-
making trends did occur following the 2002 Amendment, however, and it may be 
reasonable to attribute them in large part to the Amendment itself. 
65 See discussion infra on later trends in Section 6. 
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of the cases, a strong trend of courts attempting to preserve their 
judicial discretion is revealed.  The next Sections explore and ana-
lyze these findings. 
 
4.1.  General Observations regarding the Cases and the Outcomes 
 
“[T]his is an unfortunate outcome and one can easily understand the 
pain experienced by the family of the deceased, yet the test is not based on 
outcome but on action.”  
  Hamarsha v. The State of Israel66 
 
Several prominent observations emerged from examining the 
cases and their outcomes.  The data revealed a substantial rise in 
the number of cases after the 2002 Amendment, as well as an in-
crease in the prevalence of substantial and severe injuries.  The 
percentage of cases decided in favor of plaintiffs, however, signifi-
cantly dropped during that decade. 
As Table 1 shows, the population consisted of far more “after” 
than “before” cases.  Although one could imagine a scenario in 
which the Amendment itself led to such a rise in the number of 
cases,67 this trend actually appears to be the result of external cir-
cumstances:  an increase in the number of Palestinian casualties 
and instances of property damages as a result of IDF activity in the 
decade between 2002 and 2012.68  This surge of injuries has led to 
numerous claims, which naturally yielded more decisions.69  How-
                                                 
66 CC (Jerusalem) 11103/04 Hamarsha v. The State of Israel (2011) (Isr.) (find-
ing for the State).  
67 For example, publicity that made Palestinians more conscious of their 
right to seek a remedy for their losses.  Adv. Hleihil mentioned she believes that 
such a process has taken place in the last decade, and this might explain some of 
the differences in claim volume.  Interview with Adv. Gada Hleihil (Jan. 12, 2013). 
68 See generally Esposito, supra note 16, at 97103 (using studies conducted be-
tween 2000 and 2004 to analyze the impact of the Al-Aqsa intifada on the Israeli 
public); David A. Jaeger & M. Daniele Paserman, The Cycle of Violence?  An Empiri-
cal Analysis of Fatalities in the Palestinian–Israeli Conflict, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 1591, 
1591 (2008) (using empirical data to examine “whether violence against Israelis 
and Palestinians affects the incidence and intensity of each side's reaction”); 
B’Tselem: Isr. Info. Ctr. Human Rights Occupied Terr., Statistics, http://
www.btselem.org/statistics [https://perma.cc/5NR9-RU7M] (last visited Nov. 8, 
2016) (containing statistics regarding fatalities and casualties from First Intifada to 
present). 
69 According to information provided by “Yesh Din,” which pertains to the 
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ever, a rise in the availability of decisions in recent years, due to 
improvement in the data collection methods of commercial data-
bases, may also account for part of the difference.70 
 
Table 1: Distribution of Cases by Instance and Timing 
 
Timing 
Instance 
      1992-2002 
(Before Amen.) 
    2002-2012 
(After Amen.) 
     Total 
Magistrate  
(Published) 
      21    118 139 
District  
(Published) 
      38     68 106 
Total       59    186 245 
  
An important pattern was identified on the severity of damag-
es sustained by plaintiffs before and after the Amendment.  The 
Study pointed to a statistically significant correlation between the 
severity of damages and the Amendment (p=.04).71  That is, as Fig-
ure 1 indicates, there were significantly more cases of substantial 
and severe injuries after the Amendment compared to cases of 
minimal injuries.  This finding can be explained primarily by the 
various military operations that occurred in the OPT after 2002, 
which used more harmful weapons than those used in prior con-
frontations between IDF and Palestinians.72 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                               
years 2004-2008, a total of 5,282 claims were initiated either as lawsuits filed with 
Israeli courts or as appeals to the Israeli Ministry of Defense (on file with author).  
70 E-mails from Yafit Hannan, Database Rep., Nevo, to author (Oct. 28, 2012 
to Jan. 26, 2013) (on file with author). 
71 Note the total number of decisions which contained data on this variable 
was 231 (N=231). 
72 See CC (Jerusalem) 11103/04 Hamarsha v. The State of Israel (2011) (Isr.) 
(finding for the State); see also Sergio Catignani, The Strategic Impasse in Low-
Intensity Conflicts: The Gap Between Israeli Counter-Insurgency Strategy and Tactics 
During the Al-Aqsa Intifada, 28 J. STRATEGIC STUD. 57, 58 (2005) (alteration in origi-
nal) (describing how “tactics, weaponry[,] and training adopted” by Israel have 
been extensive and tactically successful); Interview with Adv. Hussein Abu-
Hussein (Dec. 17, 2012). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss2/5
  
2017] POWER DYNAMICS IN PALESTINIANS’ TORT CLAIMS 603 
 
Figure 1: Severity of Injuries and the Amendment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A key finding was the striking decrease in the percentage of 
cases in which courts found for plaintiffs following the Amend-
ment.  Before the Amendment the overall percentage of cases de-
cided in favor of plaintiffs was 39%.  After the Amendment, those 
cases amount to only 17% (p< .001).73  This finding seems to affirm 
the Amendment’s impact on the outcomes of cases, yet, as noted, it 
may also be attributed to the political climate generated by the es-
calation of the Conflict since the early 2000s, the same climate that 
led to the Amendment itself. 
The Study also examined the relationship between case out-
comes and various characteristics of the claims.  One important 
variable associated with outcome was plaintiffs’ involvement in 
the events which resulted in their injury, for instance by throwing 
stones at IDF soldiers.  While it was significantly more likely for 
uninvolved plaintiffs to receive favorable outcomes before the 
Amendment than after the Amendment (p=.04), it was still far 
                                                 
73 An alternative explanation for this finding would be that the decline in the 
number of decisions in favor of plaintiffs is connected to the rise in the number of 
claims filed.  That is, the population of cases may have included more “weak” 
cases after the Amendment.  However, this does not plausibly explain the whole 
trend.  
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more plausible for such “innocent” plaintiffs to win after the 
Amendment, compared with other types of plaintiffs, i.e., involved 
or whose involvement was undetermined.  Put more numerically, 
in 77% of the cases in which courts found for plaintiffs after the 
Amendment, the plaintiffs were uninvolved.74 
The data also demonstrated the detrimental effect on outcome 
when plaintiffs participated in the hostilities, particularly after the 
Amendment.  Before the Amendment, 30% of cases were favorable 
to plaintiffs when there was some level of plaintiff involvement in 
the events leading to the injury.  After the Amendment, this figure 
dropped to only 10%.75 
 
4.2.  The Reasoning of the Decisions 
 
“There are many ways to dismiss a lawsuit.”  
  Abu Asbi v. The State of Israel76 
 
 This brings us to one of the key goals of the research:  trying 
to tease out the extent to which and the ways in which courts’ rea-
soning has changed following the 2002 Amendment.  As expected, 
the Study did find several changes in the salient components of the 
reasoning after the Amendment but some of the more interesting 
findings pertained to aspects which remained unchanged. 
 First, one striking finding was the use of the statute of limita-
tions as a primary consideration for dismissing a claim.  As men-
tioned, one of the changes implemented by the Amendment was 
shortening the limitations period from seven to two years.77  This 
change proved to be influential on trial courts’ reasoning.  Whereas 
                                                 
74  Similarly, in 61% of the cases in which courts found for plaintiffs before 
the Amendment, the plaintiffs were uninvolved bystanders.  
75  This included both plaintiffs who were involved in the hostilities, and 
those who were found to have contributory negligence.  In this context, as next 
elaborated, there were also more cases applying the flexible concept of contributo-
ry negligencewhich can be set at any percentage of the responsibility for the 
harmbefore the Amendment.  See infra Section 5.  
76  CC (Jerusalem) 11524/04 Abu Asbi v. The State of Israel (2009) (Isr.) (find-
ing for the State based on laches, the plaintiff’s failure to meet the burden of proof, 
lack of IDF negligence, and by virtue of sovereign immunity). 
77  As noted, plaintiffs were also required by the Amendment to give notice 
regarding their claim within sixty days of the event or else lose their right to claim 
their losses.  Civil Tort Act, supra notes 8, 18.  
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before the Amendment only one case, which represented 2%, was 
dismissed solely due to the statute of limitations, after the 
Amendment, 16% of the dismissed cases rested on this considera-
tion.78  
Second, a statistically significant correlation was found between 
the Amendment and the courts' tendency to discuss sovereign im-
munity (R=.217; p<.001).79  That is, after the Amendment the State 
was more inclined than before the Amendment to raise the issue of 
sovereign immunity.  Therefore, courts discussed this issue more 
often in their reasoning.  This finding in itself is perhaps not sur-
prising, as the Amendment must have prompted government law-
yers to use immunity as a preliminary plea.80  However, after the 
Amendment, the percentage of cases in which courts’ reasoning 
rested solely on sovereign immunity still accounted for only 9% of 
cases favorable to the State.  This relatively low volume of cases 
may indicate that courts were not willing to withdraw from their 
traditional role of examining claims on the merits so easily, and 
pushed back against the Knesset’s attempt to limit their discretion 
to the immunity issue.81 
 Finally, another finding lies in an area that had not seen a 
significant change after the Amendment was passed.  This relates 
to courts’ inclination to conduct lengthy factual discussions as part 
of the reasoning, which remained almost constant before and after 
                                                 
78  Distributed by instance, cases dismissed based on the statute of limitations 
constituted 18% of the dismissed cases after the Amendment at magistrate courts, 
in contrast to 13% at district courts.  This contradicted interviewees’ impression 
that magistrate court judges do not tend to dismiss a case without examining it on 
the merits, unlike district court judges.  Interview with Adv. Hussein Abu-
Hussein (Dec. 17, 2012); Interview with Adv. Gada Hleihil (Jan. 12, 2013). 
79  Discussion of sovereign immunity was coded on a five step scale: (1) In-
voked-applied lengthily, i.e., over two pages; (2) Invoked-applied briefly, i.e., less 
than two pages; (3) Invoked-not applied, i.e., State argued for immunity but the 
issue went unmentioned in the reasoning or the court did not rule on this point; 
(4) Invoked-rejected, i.e., State argued for immunity but argument was rejected; 
and (5) Not invoked, i.e., the issue was not mentioned in the decision.  In the anal-
ysis, the first two categories were collapsed, then correlation was tested between 
the combined variable—Invoked-applied—and the Amendment. 
80  Alternatively, this finding might be explained by the increase in combat-
ant military actions in the last decade. 
81 Because of small numbers, it is impossible to determine the variables cor-
related with courts’ focus on sovereign immunity in these particular cases.  How-
ever, these cases will be revisited below to qualitatively tease out their similarities.  
See infra Section 5.  Many of these cases seem to share the distinct feature of exten-
sive military operations. 
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the Amendment.  Similarly, the tendency of courts to engage in 
comprehensive legal discussions with regard to the state’s liability 
persisted after the Amendment.82  In this sense, it appears that the 
courts did not fully yield to the Amendment, which aimed to nar-
row their discretion to statute of limitations and “Combat Action” 
immunity, rather than the cases’ merits.  Courts continued to pay 
close attention in a considerable number of cases to substantive as-
pects of the casefactual and legal. 
 
Figure 2: Comprehensive Factual/Legal Reasoning and the 
Amendment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3.  Litigation Costs 
 
“Under the circumstances, it seems unjust and unfit to order the 
plaintiff to pay litigation costs.”  
  Amin v. The State of Israel83 
 
“One can only regret the death of the deceased, but this does not justi-
fy imposing liability. . . . [C]onsidering the grim results of the case, there 
is no order for costs.” 
 Abu Hatla v. The State of Israel84 
 
                                                 
82 Infra Figure 2.  
83  CC (Jerusalem) 15600/01 Amin v. The State of Israel (2006) (Isr.) (finding 
for the State). 
84 CC (Haifa) 14685/94 Abu Hatla v. The State of Israel (2004) (Isr.) (finding 
for the State). 
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Another element in the content of the decisions, which points 
to a more complex judicial approach than expressed by the out-
comes, is orders for litigation costs.  Israeli courts follow the Eng-
lish law, according to which successful parties to litigation are enti-
tled to seek an order that unsuccessful parties pay their litigation 
expenses.  However, the judge has considerable discretion in ap-
plying this rule.85  Therefore, this element was assumed to be im-
portant in assessing judges’ attitudes towards the litigants, as a sort 
of window into the mind of judges.  
First, the Study revealed a striking disparity between courts’ 
approaches towards the parties with regard to costs orders, regard-
less of the Amendment.  In the overall pool of cases, while courts 
rarely avoided giving an order for costs when the State 
lostrepresenting only 7% of the casesthere was no order for 
costs in 42% of the cases in which plaintiffs lost.86  This finding 
supports the argument that courts use costs orders as a means to 
express a more lenient approach towards plaintiffs, in cases in 
which they feel compelled to find for the State due to the legal 
framework. 
But even more striking is the fact that this disparity was not as-
sociated with the Amendment:  the inclination not to render an or-
der for costs when plaintiffs lose existed before the Amendment 
and persisted after it was passed.87  The fact that judges remained 
generally lenient towards plaintiffs in deciding costs orders after 
the Amendment may point to their reluctance to give in to the anti-
plaintiff approach embodied by the 2002 Amendment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
85 See KARAYANNI, supra note 10, at 23132 (footnote omitted) (“Under Israeli 
law, the prevailing party in a civil action is entitled to receive compensation for its 
litigation expenses from the losing party.  In this respect, the trial court has broad 
discretion in determining the actual sum of compensation to be levied on the los-
ing party and can certainly take into consideration whether the prevailing party 
was also responsible for unnecessary litigation.”).  
86  See infra Figure 3 (showing decisions without order for costs by winning 
party before and after the Amendment, and in total).  
87 See infra Figure 3.  
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Figure 3: Decisions without an Order for Costs by Winning Par-
ty and Amendment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4.  Exgratia Compensation 
 
“The law tries to do justice yet law and justice are like two only par-
tially overlapping circles. . . . The State would do right if despite the out-
come of this judgment it will find a way to compensate the plaintiffs as a 
tribute of ex-gratia.”        
Husun v. Ministry of Defense88 
 
 Another way to suggest insight into judges’ attitudes to-
wards the claims was through the intriguing phenomenon of 
exgratia compensation.  That is, courts’ recommendation to the 
State to compensate plaintiffs in the absence of liability and with-
out any admission of fault on the part of the State.  The assumption 
was that such a recommendation, with regard to which courts en-
joy full discretion, might reflect their discomfort with the outcome 
or an attempt to reprimand the State for its actions.  However, 
trends in the Study were ambiguous. 
In the overall pool of cases, both before and after the Amend-
                                                 
88  CC (Acre) 3055/97 Husun v. Ministry of Defense (2001) (Isr.) (finding for 
the State).  
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ment was passed, the exgratia recommendation appeared in 7% of 
the dismissed cases.  Although not statistically significant,89 these 
cases shared several characteristics:  in 86% of them the plaintiffs 
suffered bodily harm, and in 93% the damages were either sub-
stantial or severe.  Additionally, in 86% of the cases plaintiffs were 
innocent bystanders.   
Surprisingly, though, whereas before the Amendment courts 
recommended exgratia compensation in 25% of the dismissed cas-
es, after the Amendment this recommendation was given in only 
3%.  This runs contrary to the expectation that this tool would be-
come more meaningful after the Amendment.  While at first glance 
this finding confirms the proState approach manifested by the 
outcomes, there are also alternative explanations.  It could be the 
result of courts’ recognition of the ineffectiveness of their sugges-
tions for exgratia compensation.  It might also stem from their un-
derstanding of the weaknesses of this mechanism, namely the fact 
that it allows the State to grant symbolic compensation without ac-
knowledging its wrongdoing.  As elaborated in the next Section, 
the latter view, which sees this mechanism as inappropriate, was 
expressed by several judges.90 
 
The analysis of the decisions thus portrays a complex picture of 
the way courts approach the claims.  The comprehensive case law 
analysis identified several interesting findings, the most puzzling 
of which relates to a disparity between two contradicting patterns:  
on the one hand, a sharp decrease in decisions in favor of plaintiffs 
after the Amendment, accompanied by more extensive use of the 
statute of limitations and sovereign immunity; on the other hand, a 
consistency in comprehensive factual and legal discussions; limited 
use of sovereign immunity as a sole consideration to dismiss 
claims; and a benevolent approach towards plaintiffs in costs or-
ders. 
 The complexity of the findings, this Author argues, points to 
trial courts’ attempt to preserve their judicial discretion in the wake 
of the Amendment, in areas in which they still enjoy considerable 
                                                 
89 The fourteen (14) cases were too small of a number to allow for statistical 
analysis.  However, this phenomenon will be revisited in the next Section, to ex-
amine the language used by the courts in this context, and the impression of in-
terviewees regarding ex-gratia compensation.  See infra Section 5.1.1. 
90  See infra Section 5.  Such an approach was expressed, for example, in CC 
(Haifa) 21738/01 Elmalaha v. The State of Israel (2005) (Isr.).  
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latitude.  However, these findings also raise questions that are not 
fully answered by the quantitative analysis.  Understanding how 
courts go about the process of maintaining their discretion re-
quired further investigation by delving into the rhetoric and specif-
ic circumstances of the opinions.  The next Section is thus designed 
to complement the quantitative analysis and to offer further insight 
into the findings presented in this Section. 
 
5.  BEYOND THE NUMBERS:  A QUALITATIVE LOOK INTO THE 
DECISIONS 
 
 In order to provide an account of how courts went about 
maintaining their judicial discretion, this Section conducts a quali-
tative investigation of the decisions, focusing on areas of judicial 
decision-making in which courts still have a say after the Amend-
ment.  For this purpose, the Study identified several recurrent 
themes that reflect “pockets” of discretion in court decisions:  in-
terpretation of the term “Combat Action” and the weight given to 
sovereign immunity after the Amendment; use of costs orders and 
exgratia compensation; and implications of plaintiffs’ involvement 
in the events that led to their injuries.  While these themes pull in 
different directions on the proState versus proplaintiff continu-
um, they share an important feature:  They enable courts to deter-
mine how to decide the claims, instead of yielding to the Knesset’s 
dictation.  Since the law does not provide a clear legal framework 
with regard to these issues, further investigation is required to as-
sert the way in which these tools were applied.  As detailed below, 
the findings discovered in the examination generally support pat-
terns revealed in the previous Section. 
5.1.  The Core:  Interpretation and Implementation of Sovereign 
Immunity 
5.1.1.  Interpretation of the Term “Combat Action” After the 
Amendment 
 
For some time after the 2002 Amendment was enacted, courts 
struggled with the interpretation of the new definition to the term 
“Combat Action.”  In this context, it is important to look at the “in-
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termediate cases”; that is, cases (N=60) in which the claim was filed 
before the Amendment came into force, but the decision was ren-
dered after it took effect.  Since the Amendment did not explicitly 
provide a commencement date for the definition of “Combat Ac-
tion,” the question of whether to apply it to these cases was left to 
courts’ discretion.  This resulted in courts providing varied inter-
pretations of the legal framework that applies to such claims.  The 
language used in these opinions is telling as to judges’ willingness 
(or reluctance) to accept the implications of the Amendmentand 
more importantly their insistence on maintaining their discretion. 
The most surprising and important finding was the fact that in 
over half of the intermediate cases, which represent thirty-two cas-
es, courts chose not to mention the 2002 Amendment, i.e., they either 
adjudicated the case based on precedents which interpreted the 
term “Combat Action,”91 or decided it without referring to the is-
sue of sovereign immunity.92  Furthermore, in eight additional cas-
es, courts specifically referred to the Amendment but stated that it 
does not control the case, since the event in question took place be-
fore the Amendment was enacted.93  This means that in two-thirds 
of the intermediate cases courts did not apply the newly enacted 
Amendment to the case before them.94  
In contrast, in only fourteen cases courts specifically referred to 
the application of the Amendment.  Even then, this was done for 
                                                 
91  See, e.g., CA 5964/92 Beni Uda v. The State of Israel 56(4) PD 1 (2002) (Isr.) 
(in Hebrew) (deciding the interpretation of “Combat Action” prior to Amend-
ment). 
92 In five (5) additional cases, which were not included in the thirty-two (32) 
cases mentioned, the courts ruled based on the statute of limitations and did not 
refer to sovereign immunity. 
93 However, in one of these cases the Jerusalem Magistrate Court held that 
although the 2002 Amendment did not apply to the case in question, it did reflect 
the original legislative intent regarding the term “Combat Action” should be in-
terpreted in accordance with the spirit of the Amendment:  “To complete the pic-
ture it should be noted that the current definition of the term “Combat Action” in 
the Act is very broad and it considerably limits the number of cases where victims 
will be entitled to damages from the State.  Although this definition does not ap-
ply to the case at hand, it might point to the original intent of the legislature with 
regard to the term ‘Combat Action.’” CC (Jerusalem) 15600/01 Amin v. The State 
of Israel (2006) (Isr.). 
94  Interestingly, looking only at the cases in which courts ruled for plaintiffs, 
in all but one case the courts either stated that the Amendment did not apply to 
the case or did not mention it at all.  In only one case the court held that the act 
does not constitute a “Combat Action” according to the definition provided by the 
Amendment. 
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the purpose of minimizing its relevance.  In two cases, the courts 
explicitly contended that the Amendment had not generated a 
dramatic change with regard to the scope of the term “Combat Ac-
tion” and attempted to align the definition added by the Amend-
ment with the interpretation of the term in prior cases.95 
The fact that in most intermediate casesin which courts still 
had leeway on whether to implement the Amendmentthey opt-
ed for not doing so, might teach us something about the relation-
ship between the courts and the legislature.  It suggests that judges 
preferred maintaining their flexibility in interpreting the term 
“Combat Action” to applying the definition dictated by the Knes-
set in the 2002 Amendment.  This way, they were left with more 
latitude for adjudicating the claims as they saw fit.  
 
5.1.2.  Weighting Sovereign Immunity in “After the Amendment” 
Decisions  
 
Another way for courts to preserve their discretion was to give 
sovereign immunity limited weight in their decisions.  This was 
done by reserving the use of immunity as a sole factor to extreme 
cases, on the one hand, and by relying on additional considerations 
in explaining the bulk of the decisions, on the other hand.  
Cases after the Amendment, in which courts ruled solely based 
on sovereign immunity, accounted for only 9% of the cases favora-
ble to the State.  Interestingly, delving into the facts of these cases,96 
the events in question were either an extensive military operation, 
a targeted killing, or some other form of full-fledged military activ-
ity.  None of them were anti-terrorism acts as suggested by the 
new definition of “Combat Action” set forth by the Amendment.  
                                                 
95  See CC (Haifa) 305/95 Samudi v. The State of Israel (2005) (Isr.) (finding 
for plaintiff); see also CDC (Haifa) 1081-04 Zagier v. The State of Israel (2009) (Isr.) 
(alterations in original) (“[I]n my opinion, the fact that the event in question took 
place four months before Amendment (No. 4) [the 2002 Amendment] came into 
force does not change the conclusion that ‘targeted killing’ constitutes a ‘Combat 
Action,’ both according to the current definition of the term in the Act and accord-
ing to the courts’ jurisprudence.”).  Similar interpretations were offered in cases 
brought and decided after the Amendment.  See, e.g., CC (Kfar Saba) 5305/04 Ba-
har v. The State of Israel (2007) (Isr.) (finding for the State). 
96  Except for two cases, in which the claims were dismissed due to the “Con-
flict Zones” exception, included in the 2005 Amendment, which was later invali-
dated by the HCJ. 
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For example, in one of the cases the Haifa District Court adjudicat-
ed a claim filed by the estate and dependents of a man and his two 
wives who were killed during Operation “Defensive Shield.”97  
Courts thus seemed to reserve the “trump card” of sovereign im-
munity for extreme cases of IDF operations.  This further supports 
the notion that courts were reluctant to accept the limitation of 
their discretion through the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
Thus, in the vast majority of cases, courts continued to engage 
in factual and legal discussions examining IDF potential liability, 
rather than relying solely on sovereign immunity in dismissing the 
case.  After the Amendment, the issue of sovereign immunity be-
came significantly more prevalent in parties’ arguments and 
courts’ reasoning,98 but courts tended to include this consideration 
as an additional component rather than a main ground for dismis-
sal.  Various types of rhetoric were used to incorporate other justi-
fications besides sovereign immunity as part of the reasoning.99  
The issue of sovereign immunity at times played the lead role in 
the reasoning, whereas additional discussions, either factual, legal 
or both, fulfilled a minor, supplementary function.  For example, in 
Tsabarna, the Court decided the case on the basis of sovereign im-
munity, but added the following remark: 
“Beyond necessary, I shall add that it was not established that 
the defendant is liable based on the law of torts. . . . [T]he 
plaintiff has failed to establish facts vital for proving his 
case.”100  
                                                 
97 CDC (Haifa) 679-04 The Estate of Hardan v. The State of Israel (2011) (Isr.) 
The Court’s opinion was only three pages long. 
98 See supra Section 3.2. 
99  This may indicate discomfort with establishing an unfavorable outcome 
for plaintiffs solely based on sovereign immunity on the one hand, and reluctance 
to interpret the Act too loosely on the other.  The fact that these are trial courts 
subject to review by an appellate court may play a role.  Magistrate and district 
court judges, particularly those with aspirations to be promoted to a higher in-
stance, might avoid “creative” interpretations which will be at risk of being over-
turned by an appellate court.  However, judges might also consider this an oppor-
tunity to express more judicial “courage,” which could win them credit with more 
senior judges. 
100 CDC (Jerusalem) 6506/04 Tsabarna v. The State of Israel (2009) (Isr.) (em-
phasis added). A similar trend was detected in magistrate courts’ decisions. See, 
e.g., CC (Nazareth) 1253/02 Omar v. The State of Israel (2008) (Isr.) (holding that: 
“[I]t is not without hesitation that I have reached the conclusion that the action 
conducted by the security forces constitutes a “Combat Action” and so the State is 
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 In other cases, factual issues or legal questions of liability 
were the primary components of the reasoning, and were supple-
mented by immunity as a secondary justification for the outcome, 
usually gaining only a brief reference.  For instance, in Taisir the 
Court noted: 
“[T]he discussion could have ended at this point, as the 
burden to prove the circumstances of his injury is on the 
plaintiff. . . . [T]he claim should also be denied since the de-
fendant met the burden to show the shooting was conduct-
ed in circumstances which justify immunity due to ‘Combat 
Action.’”101 
 A more radical approach was offered by the Haifa District 
Court, which noted that sovereign immunity might be revoked in 
extreme cases of unreasonable or disproportional IDF action.102  No 
decision has gone so far as implementing this approach.  In fact, 
some of the judges expressed an inclination in favor of the State 
and an adherence to the anti-plaintiff approach embodied in the 
Amendment.  Nevertheless, the vast majority of decisions did 
share this important feature:  the judges did not solely examine 
sovereign immunity.  Rather, they delved into the specific facts of 
the case and/or the substantive legal questions it raised.  Once 
again, we witness courts’ unwillingness to comply with the legisla-
ture’s attempt to limit their discretion to the issue of immunity and 
preclude judicial scrutiny of IDF actions. 
 
                                                                                                               
exempted from liability in accordance with the Act, even if its soldiers had been 
negligent. However, if I am mistaken in this conclusion, I still believe the claim 
should be denied, since the soldiers’ shooting was lawful and aimed at stopping 
the plaintiffs who were at the time suspected of planning a terrorist attack on Is-
rael.”). 
101  CDC (Haifa) 585/06 Taisir v. The State of Israel (2010) (Isr.); see also CDC 
(Jerusalem) 3125/01 The Estate of Aliwa v. The State of Israel (2009) (Isr.) (discuss-
ing at length factual and liability questions, and then adding a brief reference to 
sovereign immunity), and CC (Jerusalem) 6160/04 Arar v. The State of Israel 
(2010) (Isr.) (conducting a comprehensive factual discussion and holding that the 
plaintiff did not meet the burden of proof required to establish his case and that 
the claim is also subject to sovereign immunity due to “Combat Action”). 
102  The Court discussed the claim of a ten-year-old who suffered substantial 
injuries as a result of an operation in the city of Hebron. The Court held that it 
leaves this question unanswered, as the IDF’s conduct had been reasonable.  Zagi-
er, supra note 95. 
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5.1.3.  Favorable Outcomes Towards Plaintiffs After the 
Amendment: How? 
 
Another area, which demonstrates the courts’ endeavor to 
maintain their discretionary power, can be found in cases where 
plaintiffs won after the Amendment.  As noted, even after the 2002 
Amendment and the expansion of sovereign immunity it brought 
about, courts were still able to find for plaintiffs in a non-negligible 
group of cases.  This prompts a closer look at these cases to tease 
out the methods used by courts in overcoming the sovereign im-
munity bar.103 
One approach identified through the analysis of these cases is 
narrow interpretation.  That is, reading the term “Combat Action” so 
that it does not apply to cases of routine military activity.  Unlike 
other trends, this approach distinctly favors plaintiffs.  An example 
is the case of Abu Samra, in which the Haifa District Court adjudi-
cated a claim brought after the death of a couple and their 5-year-
old son.  The three family members were killed while picking vine 
leaves in a field near the Palestinian city of Jenin as a result of a 
shooting during an IDF road-opening mission.  The Court dis-
cussed the liability of the soldiers, as well as the question of im-
munity, and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.104  The Court’s interpre-
tative approach105 might have been inspired by the trying 
circumstances of the case, particularly the fact that the victims were 
clearly innocent bystanders.106 
 A different approach, one of disregard, is seen in a case adju-
dicated by the Jerusalem District Court and characterized by no 
                                                 
103  It should be noted that some cases resulted in a favorable outcome with 
the State’s consent. See, e.g., CC (Jerusalem) 9174/04 Daraweesh v. The State of 
Israel (2007) (Isr.), and CC (Jerusalem) 2512/03 Saliman v. The State of Israel (2005) 
(Isr.).   
104  See CDC (Haifa) 420/04 The Estate of Abu Samra v. The State of Israel 
(2011) (Isr.). See also CDC (Haifa) 661/99 Alwahidi v. The State of Israel (2006) 
(Isr.). 
105  This approach significantly departed from interpretations given to similar 
situations in other cases.  See, e.g., Hamarsha, supra note 66. 
106  A similar impression arose from the interview with Adv. Abu-Hussein, 
who represented the estates of the victims and their dependents in that case; In-
terview with Adv. Hussein Abu-Hussein (Dec. 17, 2012). 
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less unfortunate circumstances.  In the case of Aramin, an 11-year-
old girl on her way back from school died from a rubber bullet shot 
by Military Police Corps soldiers, which caused a severe head inju-
ry.  The Court comprehensively reviewed the evidence of the case 
and concluded that the soldiers were negligent in conducting the 
shooting.  It did not mention the issue of sovereign immunity.107  
Although this approach was used to a lesser extent than the nar-
row interpretation approach,108 it suggests that in some cases, 
courts may disregard sovereign immunity altogether.109 
These cases suggest that even after the 2002 Amendment courts 
still had sufficient leeway to find for plaintiffs in certain cases, 
should they decide to do so.  This leeway stems from judges’ ten-
dency to review cases on the merits, even in instances of “Combat 
Action,” and to rarely rest the reasoning solely on immunity.  This 
allowed courts to maintain their discretion despite the sovereign 
immunity limitation and enabled some courts to rule in favor of 
plaintiffs when they deemed it justifiable.110 
 
5.2.  Courts’ “Final Word”: Costs and Ex-gratia Compensation 
 
 Two particular elements in the decisions showed interesting 
                                                 
107 See CDC (Jerusalem) 9334/07 The Estate of Aramin v. The Ministry of De-
fense (2010) (Isr.). 
108 A similar approach was taken in the case of Zidan, which revolved 
around a reconnaissance mission of military vehicles that went wrong when the 
soldiers suspected that a car driving on the road contained a bomb.  It was later 
discovered that the passengers of the car were three women, Israeli residents, on 
their way to visit a relative in the OPT.  Although the Court did not find the sol-
diers were negligent, it ruled for the plaintiffs based on “considerations of justice 
and equal distribution of social burdens.”  CDC (Haifa) 752/04 The Estate of Zi-
dan v. The State of Israel (2011) (Isr.) 
109  This may also be connected to the seniority and status of the presiding 
judge.  The case of Aramin was decided by Judge Ef’al-Gabai, who is a senior 
judge in the Jerusalem District Court. Supra, note 107.  
110  Adv. Abu-Hussein reflected a similar perception of the courts’ approach, 
focusing on the identity of the judge sitting on the bench.  Interview with Adv. 
Hussein Abu-Hussein (Dec. 17, 2012).  The same impression was manifested by 
Adv. Hleihil, and regarding judges’ approach to the cases she noted that: “It 
mainly depends on the particular judge.  Some believe these cases do not stand a 
chance while others are willing to find for plaintiffs in certain cases.  However, the 
general approach is very much against these claims.” Interview with Adv. Gada 
Hleihil (Jan. 12, 2013). 
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and surprising trends in the quantitative analysis: litigation costs 
orders and the recommendation to pay ex-gratia compensation.  A 
common feature to both these issues is their inclusion in the final 
part of the decision, usually accompanied by the personal impres-
sion of the judge from the case.  This discretionary area provides us 
with a window of sorts into judges’ state of mind in adjudicating 
the cases. 
5.2.1.  Courts’ Rhetoric Regarding Costs Orders 
 As mentioned, in a substantial group of cases, courts did not 
issue a costs order against losing plaintiffs.  These cases were typi-
cally related to bodily injuries rather than property damages.  Be-
yond this consideration, the research found three recurring pat-
terns used to justify a decision not to order plaintiffs to pay costs, 
often applied in tandem.111   
First, the young age of plaintiffs was repeatedly used as a reason 
not to order costs, underscoring the loss of future opportunities for 
the victim.  Courts used statements such as, “the plaintiff was a 
young man, 20 years old at the time of the event,”112 or, “in this 
tragic case, a young boy was injured,”113 in justifying their avoid-
ance from issuing costs orders.  
Second, courts tended to emphasize the severity of the injury 
sustained by plaintiffs or the gravity of their condition as grounds 
not to order costs.  Courts mentioned justifications such as, “con-
sidering the severe injury sustained by the plaintiff, there is no or-
der for costs”114 or, “given the circumstances and considering the 
                                                 
111  In addition, a fourth class of decisions did not provide specific justifica-
tions for the decisions and simply mentioned that the court is refraining from giv-
ing an order for costs “under the circumstances” or due to “considerations of jus-
tice.”  See CC (Nazareth) 5450/05 Najam v. The State of Israel (2008) (Isr.) 
(dismissing the case on the basis of statute of limitations). See also CC (Jerusalem) 
6348/04 Sa’ada v. The State of Israel (2008) (Isr.) (dismissing the case based on 
lack of liability on the part of the State and sovereign immunity, but suggesting 
that the State should consider paying ex-gratia compensation).  
112 CC (Nazareth) 6778/07 Abu-Tabich v. The State of Israel (2011) (Isr.) 
(mentioning the serious orthopedic disability the plaintiff sustained as justifica-
tion). See also CC (Nazareth) 731/07  The Estate of Skafi v. The State of Israel (2009) 
(Isr.). 
113  CC (Jerusalem) 2347/04 Abu-Juda v. The State of Israel (2008) (Isr.) (also 
noting that the plaintiff was an innocent bystander, who was uninvolved in the 
event).  
114  See CC (Haifa) 1044/98 Alshaid v. The Military Commander in the Gaza 
Strip (2002) (Isr.). 
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serious injury of the plaintiff as a result of the shooting, I refrain 
from ordering legal expenses and attorney’s fees.”115 
Third, as elaborated below, a reference to plaintiffs’ non-
involvement in the events (that is, the fact that they were merely in-
nocent bystanders injured by no fault of their own) was also used 
as a reason not to order costs.116 
 It seems that judges’ rhetoric in decisions rendered both be-
fore and after the Amendment supports the assumption that courts 
feel discomfort when they find for the State in certain claims, par-
ticularly when they pertain to young, severely injured, and inno-
cent bystander plaintiffs, or any combination of the three character-
istics.  Although courts usually found for the State after the 
Amendment, they often used their broad discretion on litigation 
costs as a platform to express their personal impression of the case 
and its tragic circumstances. 
 
5.2.2.  Courts’ Rhetoric Regarding Ex-gratia Compensation 
 
The topic of ex-gratia compensation revealed ambiguous trends 
in the quantitative analysis.  It is thus interesting to look at the lan-
guage the courts chose to use in referring to this issue. 
First, cases in which courts recommended ex-gratia compensa-
tion were characterized by particularly difficult circumstances.  In 
some,117 the judges explicitly underscored the nature of the circum-
stances in the recommendation to grant ex-gratia payments.  For in-
stance, in Elmatsri, the Court stated:  “Unfortunately, the plaintiff 
                                                 
115  CC (Nazareth) 5682/01 Yusuf v. The State of Israel (2006) (Isr.). For addi-
tional examples, see CC (Jerusalem) 4130/02 Razam v. The State of Israel (2006) 
(Isr.) (holding that: “In light of the plaintiff’s injury, I do not see fit to order him to 
pay costs.”); CC (Haifa) 6144/04 Faiz v. The State of Israel (2008) (Isr.); CC (Jerusa-
lem) 9188/04 Manasara v. The State of Israel (2009) (Isr.); CC (Nazareth) 1558/08 
Almakus v. The State of Israel (2005) (Isr.); CC (Jerusalem) 20790/98  Issa v. The 
State of Israel (2005) (Isr.). 
116  See CC (Haifa) 4066/02 The Estate of Abad v. The State of Israel (2012) 
(Isr.). See also CC (Haifa) 1287/94 Hatib v. The State of Israel (2005) (Isr.); CC (Tel-
Aviv) 4066/02 The Estate of Abu-Zahara v. The State of Israel (2011) (Isr.) (dis-
missing a case brought by a bystander Palestinian journalist from the Palestinian 
city of Jenin based on sovereign immunity and the fact that the plaintiffs did not 
meet the burden of proof for showing that the injury was caused by IDF shoot-
ing); CC (Jerusalem) 5503/01  Abu-Atsi v. The State of Israel (2003) (Isr.).  
117 This was the case in a total of six (6) cases. 
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was injured with no fault of his own . . . Although the remedy for 
the plaintiff cannot be found within the law of torts, the State 
would do right if it would consider ex-gratia compensation.”118  In 
other cases, courts suggested that the State should offer compensa-
tion, without indicating in the judgment the specific circumstances 
which justified it, or by referring only to the outcome of the case.119  
Similarly, this issue was introduced in one case following the dis-
missal of the claim based on the statute of limitations.120 
Second, although only two decisions expressed a negative view 
of ex-gratia payments, they are important in potentially explaining, 
at least in part, the lesser tendency to suggest ex-gratia compensa-
tion after the Amendment.  In this context, the Be’er-Sheva District 
Court noted:  
“Giving compensation or an exemption from the usual or-
der for costs “ex-gratia” constitutes a differential endow-
ment not in accordance with the equal criteria set forth by 
the legislature. . . . Such appropriation contrasts both with 
the principle of legality and with the principle of equali-
ty.”121  
 While recommendations for ex-gratia compensation are ap-
plied to a lesser extent by courts than the avoidance of costs orders, 
and prompt various views among judges, they still constitute a 
space for some judges to express their discomfort with the outcome 
they reached and to protect their judicial discretion in the face of 
the legislature’s attempts to limit it. 
 
                                                 
118  CC (Jerusalem) 9244/07 Elmatsri v. The State of Israel (2012) (Isr.). See also 
Sa’ada, supra note 111; CC (Haifa) 17063-01-09  The Estate of Zalt v. The State of Is-
rael (2012) (Isr.) (mentioning that there was no dispute regarding the fact that the 
plaintiff had died as a result of IDF shooting although she was an innocent by-
stander, and suggesting it would be appropriate if the State compensated the vic-
tim’s family at least partially).  
119 See Hamarsha, supra note 66. 
120 See CC (Nazareth) 7997/97 Abahara v. The State of Israel (2002) (Isr.). 
This statement is interesting since as we witnessed in Section 4, supra, the State 
has used the statute of limitations in these claims much more frequently in the 
decade between 2002 and 2012, in the wake of the Amendment, which shortened 
the limitations period from seven to two years. 
121  CC (Beit Shemesh) 5193/08 Masari Gabon Ltd. v. The State of Israel 
(2012) (Isr.).  A similar approach was expressed by one of the interviewees, who 
mentioned his unwillingness to cooperate with the Ex-Gratia Committee.  Inter-
view with Adv. Hussein Abu-Hussein (Dec. 17, 2012). 
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5.3.  Undefined Domain: Implications of Plaintiff Involvement in the 
Incident for Remedy Eligibility 
 
A final issue in which courts enjoy considerable discretion is 
the implications of plaintiffs’ involvement in the events that led to 
the claim, for instance, by throwing stones or otherwise confront-
ing IDF soldiers ("plaintiff involvement").  Since the law does not 
explicitly determine the consequences of plaintiff involvement in 
the cases in question,122 courts used this vagueness as an additional 
opportunity for asserting judicial discretion. 
Before the Amendment, the courts treated plaintiff involve-
ment flexibly by using the non-dichotomous concept of contributo-
ry negligence, which allows courts to determine various degrees of 
involvement as a percentage from the overall liability.  In contrast, 
after the Amendment, we find a transition to a dichotomous ap-
proach, which views plaintiffs as either involved or uninvolved in 
the hostilities.  This transition was reflected in the quantitative ac-
count of the outcomes, showing that while before the Amendment, 
involved plaintiffs were at times awarded damages, after the 
Amendment this phenomenon has all but vanished.123  In accord-
ance with this trend, the courts’ language has also changed, from 
reflecting the level of plaintiff involvement as a percentage of the 
overall liability,124 to merely determining whether the plaintiff was 
involved.  Courts’ treatment of uninvolved plaintiffs has also 
changed after the Amendment, namely, a more favorable treat-
ment towards uninvolved plaintiffs was identified before the 
Amendment. 
In contrast to these changes, the rhetoric of the decisions re-
flected a similar approach towards plaintiff involvement both be-
fore and after the Amendment.  In relation to involved plaintiffs, 
unsurprisingly, courts repeatedly uttered their negative perception 
of them.  For instance, in a decision given before the Amendment, 
                                                 
122 See Tort Ordinance, 1968, § 64 (as amended) (Isr.) (defining merely the 
general term “contributory negligence," and omitting a specific reference to this 
issue in the Act). 
123 With the exception of two cases: See CC (Jerusalem) 1412/98 Hanan v. 
The State of Israel (2003) (Isr.), and CC (Haifa) 643/99 Id v. The Military Com-
mander (2006) (Isr.). 
124  See, e.g., CC (Jerusalem) 1608/98 Natsha v. The State of Israel (2000) (Isr.) 
(determining that the plaintiff took part in the event by throwing stones, but de-
ciding to still award compensation, albeit reduced). 
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the court remarked: 
“In the basis of the decision whether to award damages to a 
victim of IDF shooting in the territories [OPT – G.J.B.] is the 
distinction between an innocent victim . . . and a casualty 
injured while conducting a hostile and dangerous activity.  
In the latter case, the public interest obliges courts to deny 
the claim.”125 
In decisions rendered after the Amendment, courts articulated 
the same approach.126 
Interestingly, though, at least in their rhetoric, courts expressed 
a stringent approach towards innocent bystanders too, noting non-
involvement as irrelevant to establishing entitlement for damages.  
For instance, in the case of Natser, decided before the Amendment, 
the Jerusalem District Court noted that the fact that the plaintiff 
might have been an innocent bystander does not in itself suggest 
that he should be entitled for damages.127  The Kfar-Saba Magis-
trate Court pronounced an essentially identical view after the 
Amendment.128 
 Hence, though the rhetoric of courts on plaintiff involvement 
was consistent before and after the Amendment, the outcomes car-
ried a difference in tone.  This gap has become somewhat narrower 
after the Amendment, yet the presence of the plaintiff involvement 
factor has far from disappeared.  This factor was apparent, as we 
have seen, in cases in which judges ruled in favor of plaintiffs after 
the Amendment.  In such cases, judges based their decision in part 
on plaintiffs being innocent bystanders to the events.129  Moreover, 
as noted, in costs orders and ex-gratia compensation recommenda-
tions, courts were more benevolent towards uninvolved plaintiffs 
after the Amendment.  In light of these findings, it seems plaintiff 
                                                 
125 CC (Haifa) 1110/94 Sha’at v. The State of Israel (1998) (Isr.).  
126 See CC (Haifa) 187/99 Halil v. The State of Israel (2007) (Isr.); CC (Haifa) 
1008/98 Azuni v. The Military Commander in Judea and Samaria (2007) (Isr.).  
127 See CDC (Jerusalem) 210/93 The Estate of Natser v. The State of Israel 
(1995) (Isr.). 
128 See CC (Tel-Aviv) 5305/04 The Estate of Bahar v. The State of Israel (2007) 
(Isr.).  See also CC (Nazareth) 1088/02 Sarhahn v. The State of Israel (2008) (Isr.). 
129  See, e.g., CC (Afula) 3254/00 Naaman v. The State of Israel (2005) (Isr.) 
(holding that: “I do not think the minor inconsistencies in the plaintiff’s version 
change the fact that he was an innocent bystander injured with no fault of his own 
and it should be noted that he was a 9-year-old boy at the time.”).   
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involvement remains an influential factor used by courts to contin-
ue to exercise their discretion after the Amendment. 
 
6.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The back-and-forth dialogue (at times, more aptly described as 
a battle) between courts and legislatures has been the subject of 
abundant doctrinal and empirical scholarship over the years.  
However, the literature on judiciary-legislature relations has fo-
cused predominantly on supreme courts.  This Article expands the 
current scholarship by examining a neglected domain: whether Is-
raeli trial courts adjudicating sensitive political cases interact with 
the legislature in a mode similar to the Israeli Supreme Court.  
More specifically, the Study focused on the way courts respond to 
a legislative change aimed at influencing their case law when ad-
judicating politically-charged cases. 
 The analysis of court decisions rendered in tort claims 
brought by Palestinians against the State of Israel for damages sus-
tained by IDF actions showed an interesting duality in the way tri-
al courts dealt with an amendment to the governing law.  On the 
one hand, the analysis showed considerable compliance with the 
requirements of the legislature as expressed by the 2002 Amend-
ment and the anti-plaintiff approach the Amendment communi-
cated.  This was manifested most clearly by looking at the out-
comes of cases:  favorable outcomes for plaintiffs decreased 
significantly following the Amendment, despite a simultaneous 
rise in the number of claims and their severity.  There was also a 
growing trend of using sovereign immunity and statute of limita-
tions considerations in the opinions.  In this sense, the courts can 
be understood as accommodating the public’s mindset regarding 
the Conflict, as signified by the anti-plaintiff legislation.  Per this 
explanation, the courts acted passively, merely reflecting social at-
titudes as well as the interests of the political system.130 
 On the other hand, a deeper inquiry into the decisions, both 
quantitatively and qualitatively, discovered attempts by the courts 
to protect judicial discretion in the face of the legislative change.  
Courts were willing to scrutinize IDF actions to a similar extent as 
                                                 
130  See Barzilai, supra note 46. 
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they did before the Amendment, relegating the issue of immunity 
to a secondary role in their decision-making.  Courts maintained 
“pockets” of discretion, regarding litigation costs orders, recom-
mendations for ex-gratia compensation, and the weight given to 
plaintiff involvement.  These trends suggest a judicial attempt to 
defend the institutional power and independence of the courts vis-
à-vis the Knesset’s efforts to dictate its desired process. 
 In this respect, the research indicates that despite the focus 
of previous literature on supreme courts, lower courts (at least 
those that deal with sensitive political disputes) might be no less 
inclined to interact with the legislature through statutory interpre-
tation.  Support for this courts-legislature dialogue can be found in 
the recent legislation regarding state liability for IDF actions.  As 
noted, in 2012, an additional amendment to the Act was enacted.  
Among other provisions, the 2012 Amendment explicitly obliges 
courts to rule on sovereign immunity pleas prior to delving into 
the specific facts of the case.131  The purpose of the 2012 Amend-
ment seems obvious in light of this Study:  to prevent courts from 
examining IDF actions on the merits in cases where the military ac-
tion constituted a “Combat Action,” and thus lowering the level of 
military accountability before the courts.  This may reflect a legisla-
tive response to courts' decision-making trends found in this 
Study.  The 2012 Amendment clearly shows that the legislature is 
trying to confine judicial discretion in the claims to the simple ap-
plication of “Combat Action” immunity. 
However, follow-up research indicates132 that since the 2012 
Amendment was promulgated, the courts’ approach towards the 
claims has begun to converge with the legislator’s.  The dwindling 
number of cases in which courts find for plaintiffs,133 and the 
overwhelming procedural requirements strictly enforced by the 
                                                 
131  Civil Torts Act, 2012 §§ 2(2) (as amended) (Isr.) (explaining that: “If the 
State argued as a preliminary argument that it is not liable for the act in question 
since it constitutes a Combat Action under subsection (a), the court shall consider 
the argument immediately, and if found that the act was a Combat Action as 
aforesaid, reject the claim.”).  
132  See Bachar, supra note 24 (noting the change in Israeli courts' approach 
towards the claims in question, evident in the willingness to adopt the State's use 
of procedure to block claims from being adjudicated on the merits). 
133 See Report in Response to a Freedom of Information (FOIA) Query to the 
MOD (in Hebrew), (Aug. 3, 2015) http://bit.ly/2a982nf [https://perma.cc/6SUC-
7RMM]; Report in Response to MOD FOIA Query (Nov. 13, 2016) (on file with au-
thor).  
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courts on Palestinian plaintiffs bringing tort claims against the 
State,134 seem to suggest that the courts are beginning to line up 
with the Knesset’s anti-plaintiff approach towards these claims.  
One question which arises from this Study is why courts acted 
as they did in adjudicating the claims following the 2002 Amend-
ment.  Was it a matter of protecting their institutional status, as the 
neo-institutional approach would argue, or was it judges’ personal 
desire to promote certain values, as other attitudinal models posit?  
In politically-charged cases, it is difficult to contend that judges’ 
own values would be irrelevant.  The courts are undoubtedly af-
fected to some extent by judges' personal views regarding the Is-
raeli-Palestinian Conflict.  Yet, in what way does the surrounding 
reality affect them?  Unlike Mautner, who sees the judiciary as rep-
resenting elite groups who hold liberal values,135 this Article sug-
gests a more complex picture by which values pull in different di-
rections on the pro-State versus pro-plaintiff continuum, either 
criticizing IDF actions that violate Palestinians’ human rights, or 
underscoring Israel’s right to defend itself and thus justifying IDF 
conduct.  It seems likely that the political identity of the judge sit-
ting on the bench influences both the rhetoric and outcome of a 
case.136 
Still, overall, and whatever their underlying motives, this Arti-
cle showed that the judges’ behavior allowed them to maintain 
their role in scrutinizing IDF conduct in the OPT.  As a result of 
this oversight, the State was repeatedly required to present evi-
dence regarding the details of military actions in the OPT resulting 
in injuries or property damage to Palestinians, thus promoting IDF 
accountability despite the tendency to rule in the State’s favor.  
Moreover, as we have seen, some judges found for plaintiffs in cer-
tain cases, even after the Amendment, and signaled the State that it 
                                                 
134 See Bachar, supra note 24 (describing the categories of procedural barriers 
blocking Palestinians’ claims).  
135  See MAUTNER, supra note 47. 
136 The following quote from one of the interviews reflects the potential im-
pact of judges’ personal values and political views on the outcome of the case, at 
least in the eyes of the lawyers bringing the cases:  “I believe that in the end of the 
day we are dealing with human beings and regardless of this [the Conflict] judges 
always go through an internal dialogue with themselves.  Eventually, judges are 
human beings as well; some of them may be more sensitive; some are Arabs and 
see plaintiffs as regular people; some may be racist.  The system has all kinds of 
judges.  The judge you end up with has a lot of influence on how your case turns 
out.”  Interview with Adv. Hussein Abu-Hussein (Dec. 17, 2012). 
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should acknowledge its wrongdoing in still other cases.  Neverthe-
less, perhaps due to judges’ concern of appellate court overturn, of 
legislative override, or of other counter-reactions that would im-
pair their institutional autonomy,137 this was done quite rarely.  
More often, courts employed subtle ways of intervening in the leg-
islature’s policy, employing their reasoning and other discretionary 
tools to this end. 
The remaining question is whether the courts were doing eve-
rything in their power, considering the hand they were dealt, to 
maintain their independence and some measure of judicial moni-
toring of IDF actions.  While the separation of powers demands 
that political priorities be determined by the legislature, judicial 
independence is crucial to make sure that the outcomes of cases are 
not simply dictated by the powers-that-be.  This is especially true 
for those disputes in which the authorities themselves are implicat-
ed.  However, while Edelman speaks to the high value placed on 
the independence of civil courts by Israeli society,138 recent years 
have seen a decline in the Israeli public’s regard towards the 
courts.139  This trend may well impact the capacity of courts, both 
on the lower levels and on the Supreme Court level, to push back 
against restrictive legislation like the 2002 and 2012 Amendments. 
Indeed, the continuous state of conflict between Israel and the 
Palestinians requires all courts, not only the Supreme Court, to as-
sume a difficult role:  striking a delicate balance between drawing 
the boundaries of state liability for IDF actions according to the 
confines imposed by the legislation, and ensuring the State accepts 
responsibility in adequate cases, thereby exercising a more lenient 
approach towards plaintiffs when appropriate.  This balance de-
mands caution on the part of courts.  It requires a firm insistence 
on an independent judicial system, in order to serve as guardians 
of human rights values.  In this respect, recent trends showing a 
                                                 
137 See Dotan, supra note 49 (commenting on the Supreme Court’s conduct in 
this respect). 
138 EDELMAN, supra note 60, at 11 (noting that the civil judiciary is seen as the 
institutional repository of the values that Israelis place on independent, objective, 
and impartial decision-making).   
139 In a general survey conducted in 2015, only 30% of the public expressed 
full trust in the Israeli justice system.  Hen Ma’anit, Survey: All Time Low in the 
Public Trust in the Legal System, the Parliament and the Police, GLOBES (2015) (Isl.) (in 
Hebrew), http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001076264 (last visit-
ed Nov. 8, 2016) [https://perma.cc/Y78P-H6QB].  
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stringent approach among courts towards Palestinian plaintiffs are 
cause for concern.  These trends should be further investigated in 
future studies.  
This Study was a first attempt to systematically analyze data 
and derive insights on tort lawsuits brought by Palestinians against 
the State of Israel in the context of the Conflict.  However, much 
more research is still needed.  Research already underway looks at 
the use of procedural tools to restrict Palestinians’ access to Israeli 
civil courts.140  Additional work examines the legal actors who 
bring the claims and their impact on the litigation.141  Future re-
search should explore the way Palestinian victims perceive their 
injuries and the remedies for them, as well as their impressions of 
Israeli court proceedings.  This may help illuminate the potential 
value of such litigation on a broader level, namely whether it can 
play a role in the resolution of the Conflict.  Furthermore, future 
work should compare the Israeli-Palestinian mechanism to other 
tools for compensating victims of armed conflict, in order to better 
assess the mechanism in question.  Hopefully, the findings de-
scribed in this Article will help pave the way for such future re-
search. 
 
                                                 
140  Bachar, supra note 24. 
141 Gilat Bachar, When Lawyers Go to War: A Study of Plaintiffs’ Lawyers in Pal-
estinians’ Tort Claims against Israel (Nov. 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author) (analyzing the motivations and practices engaged in by lawyers in 
the context of using tort law to affect social change or mobilize a movement). 
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